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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Three Essays on Bio-security. 
(December 2009) 
Qi Gao, B.A., Southwestern University of Finance and Economics; 
M.S., University of Tennessee; 
M.S., Texas A &M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A, McCarl 
 
        In this dissertation, several essays in the field of bio-security are presented. 
        The estimation of the probability of an FMD outbreak by type and location of 
premises is important for decision making. In Essay I, we estimate and predict the 
probability/risk of an FMD outbreak spreading to the various premises in the study area. 
We first used a Poisson regression model with adjustment dispersion associated with 
random simulation results from the AusSpead model to estimate the parameters of the 
model. Our estimation and prediction show that large cattle loss could be concentrated in 
three counties-Deaf Smith, Parmer, and Castro. These results are based on approximately 
70% of the feedlots with over 10,000 cattle located in the three counties previously 
mentioned. 
        In Essay II, our objective is to determine the best mitigation strategies in minimizing 
animal loss based on AusSpead simulation model. We tested 15 mitigation strategies by 
using multiple comparison. The results show that the best mitigation strategies for all four 
scenarios are regular surveillance, slaughter of the infected animals, and early detection. 
 iv
We then used the Mixed Integer Programming to estimate costs of disposing of animal 
carcasses and transportation. Results show that the unit disposal cost will vary with 
carcass scale and the unit transportation cost also varies with the distribution of the 
infected premises and disposal locations. 
        FMD seems to have varying impacts on equity markets. In Essay III, we studied 
returns at three different levels of the stock market. We determined results in a structural 
break, and then estimated the impact of the announcement of confirmed cases of FMD 
disease on the volatility of stock market returns by using a GARCH-Mean model. Our 
results show that the structure break occurs on the day with the largest number of 
confirmed cases for meat product firms rather than the day of the first confirmed case. 
We found that the conditional volatilities over the FMD period are higher than those over 
the sample period. The announcement of confirmed cases had the largest marginal impact 
on meat products. Investors may always consider maintaining a portfolio consisting of 
index funds or hedge funds. 
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Concerns about invasive species and foreign animal diseases have escalated substan-
tially in recent years. Terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 greatly increased
the awareness of the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to bioterrorism. In response to these
concerns, President Bush signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre-
paredness and Response Act of 2002. The purpose of this Act is”To improve the ability
of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public
health emergencies” (107th Congress, 2002).
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed
domestic and wild animals, such as cattle, bison, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer. Because
FMD is highly contagious, it is arguably one of the most important livestock diseases in
terms of economic impact throughout the world. It can be spread though air, transport
vehicles, artificial insemination, milk-related transmission, direct contact, and by wildlife
such as birds, dogs, cats, and rodents. Infected animals do not show the signs of the disease
for a couple of weeks but are contagious during the latter part of that time (Bouma et al.,
2003). This means the infected animals are spreading the disease before they are diagnosed
and removed from the herd. Variations in weather, regional geography, farming practices,
The format and style follow that of American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
2and farm-level bio-security practices could all introduce spatial and temporal heterogeneity
into transmission patterns.
FMD outbreaks have proven to be costly because they have occurred throughout the
world.A Taiwanese outbreak was estimated to cost (in U.S.) $187.5 million in 1997 (Yang
et al., 1997). The U.K. FMD outbreak between February 20 and September 30, 2001 ex-
hibited a total of 2,026 confirmed cases of FMD with the direct cost to the public sector
estimated at over $3 billion and the cost to the private sector estimated at over $5 billion
(National Audit Office (NAO), 2002). Compensation and other payments to farmers totaled
nearly $1.4 billion, and direct costs of measures to deal with the epidemic, including the
purchase of goods and services to eradicate the disease, amounted to nearly $1.3 billion.
Other public sector costs were estimated at $0.3 billion. In the private sector, the areas most
affected by the outbreak were agriculture, the food chain and supporting services, which in-
curred net costs of $0.6 billion, and tourism and supporting industries, which lost revenues
of between $4.5 billion and $5.4 billion (National Audit Office(NAO): The 2001 Outbreak
of Foot and Mouth Disease). The estimated net direct economic effect of the outbreak was
less than $2 billion, 0.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. The net economic effect was
less than the£ 5 billion cost to agriculture and tourism because many of the losses suffered
by individuals and firms led to equivalent amounts being spent elsewhere in the economy
(National Audit Office (NAO): The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease).
In the U.S., FMD was first discovered in 1870. Since the initial outbreak, there have
been eight additional outbreaks, with the last being a mild epidemic in California in 1929.
In 1914, the U.S. had its most devastating FMD outbreak, which began in Michigan and
spread to the Chicago stockyards by 1915. Overall, FMD had spread to 22 states, and
172,000 cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats were destroyed during the eradication program (Mc-
3Cauley et al., 1979).
Ekboir (1999) applied input-output (I-O) methods to examine the potential effects of
a FMD outbreak in California and calculated a range of losses of $8.5-$13.5 billion. A
substantial share of those estimated effects, $6 billion, resulted from the assumption that
U.S. meat exports would cease. Paarlberg and Seitzinger (2002) (2002) employed partial
equilibrium analysis to determine the effects of an FMD outbreak in the United States
similar to the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. They estimate a U.S. farm income
loss of $14.0 billion and a reduction in national consumer expenditure of 7%.
Texas is the largest cattle production state in the U.S., with more than 14 million cat-
tle and calves produced annually. The largest source of Texas agricultural revenue comes
from the sale of beef cattle. Texas produces about 20% of the nation’s beef cattle and ranks
number one in the country in the value of cattle raised. With an estimated 6 million cattle
on feed, the Texas feedlot industry is valued at more than $8 billion annually, according
to U.S. Department of Agriculture: National Agricultural Statistics Service, ”Texas State
Agriculture Overview, 2004,” January 3, 2006. The predominant concentration of the feed-
lot industry in Texas is within the Panhandle region.
The High Plains study region comprises a 5-county area in the Panhandle of Texas
(Figure 1). This area covers 7,942 square miles, and according to the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), which is responsible for maintaining records on con-
centrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) (including feedlots and dairies), there are 92
feedlots and 76 dairies in the study area. The feedlots range in size from 10,000 to over
100,000 cattle. Spatial estimates of the study area grazing beef cattle were developed using
land parcel data from the USDA Farm Services Agency (FSA) and the estimated carry-
ing capacity from the National Resources Range Capacity guides. An estimated 411,019
4grazing beef cattle are distributed over 10,000 land parcels in the study region (Ward et al.,
2004).
1.2 Objectives
Ex-ante risk analysis and ex-post response actions are important issues for animal
disease management. Ex-ante efforts are designed to prevent or reduce the probability
of certain classes of attacks, while ex-post efforts involve rapid response to attacks and the
minimization of associated damages. In the absence of a wealth of observable data on FMD
outbreaks, disease modeling is the main tool for predicting the likely spread of the disease
and for evaluating the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies (Bates et al., 2003). In
this study, we used a disease model to conduct ex-ante analysis, including vulnerability and
carcass disposal analysis, and ex-post response effects on the stock market in the U.K.
The objectives of this study are to contribute to ex-ante analysis, including vulnerabil-
ity and carcass-disposal analysis by simulation model because of the absence of observable
data on FMD outbreaks ex-post response on the stock market in the U.K.
The thesis is organized as follows. The objectives of Chapter II are to identify vul-
nerable areas and predict expected cattle loss under different scenarios. To achieve these
goals, we used a Poisson regression model with adjustment dispersion associated with ran-
dom simulation results from the AusSpead model to estimate the parameters of the model
given one location as the starting point in the simulation, and we predicted the probabil-
ity/risk and expected cattle loss of an FMD outbreak spreading to the premises given other
premises as starting points in the study area.
The aim of Chapter III is to test the best mitigation strategies with average minimum
5Figure 1: High Plains Study Area
6animal loss and under the best strategy. We make preparation for the ”worst” status, esti-
mating costs of disposing of animal carcasses and transportation following a largest FMD
outbreak under four different scenarios, and examining the effectiveness of disposal strate-
gies. To achieve the goal, we tested 15 mitigation strategies based on simulation results
by multiple comparison and the best strategy group, then we selected one of the best miti-
gation strategies for four different scenarios and estimated minimum costs of disposing of
animal carcasses and transportation.
The objective of Chapter IV is to measure how different impacts of the FMD among
entire financial markets, the food product and retail industry, and individual food product
companies represented individual food companies. It may help investors to understand the
risk and build accurate asset pricing models that will yield superior forecasts for return
volatility. To achieve this goal, we first used summary statistics and univariate GARCH to
generally describe those six markets, then we applied a modified GARCH-in mean model
to measure the different impacts of the announcement of confirmed cases by government
agencies or public media.
7CHAPTER II
IDENTIFYING VULNERABLE AREAS
2.1 Introduction
FMD has not been present in the United States since 1929. However, recent outbreaks
in previously disease-free countries (including Japan, South Korea, France, the Nether-
lands, and the U.K.) have highlighted the importance of well-planned response strategies
for regaining disease freedom after an outbreak, as well as for minimizing costs and facili-
tating recovery following an incursion of FMD (Garner and Beckett, 2005).
The estimation of the probability of FMD outbreak by type and location of premises
is important for decision making. There are over 10,000 premises in the study area, each of
which has a different probability for FMD occurrence. This chapter proposes to estimate
and predict the probability/risk of FMD outbreak spreading to the premises in the study
area. Specifically, our objectives are to identify vulnerable areas and to predict expected
cattle loss under different scenarios. To achieve those goals, we used a Poisson regres-
sion model with adjustment dispersion associated with random simulation results from the
AusSpead model to estimate the parameters of the model given one location as a start point
in the simulation, and we predict the probability/risk and expected cattle loss of FMD out-
break spreading to the premises given other premises as start points in the study area.
82.2 Review of AusSpread
2.2.1 Conceptual Review of AusSpread
AusSpread is a state-transition model that has been developed based on Markov chain
concepts with modifications to include stochastic elements in the transition (disease spread)
probabilities (Garner and Beckett, 2005). Stochastic elements are represented as probabil-
ity distributions, which incorporate the uncertainty or natural variation inherent in particular
model parameters. Monte Carlo methods are used to select values from these probability
distributions each time that the model is ”run.” The process leads to output distributions
from which statistics such as minimums, maximums, means, and medians can be obtained.
Conceptually, the outbreak can be considered in two phases. First, prior to the first
reporting of FMD (pre-detection phase), the disease can readily spread with the normal
pattern of animal movements and other forms of interaction within the region. Second,
once the disease has been confirmed, a control and eradication program is initiated (post-
detection phase) and disease spread will be hampered by, for example, restrictions on
the movement of livestock and reductions in inter-farm contact, by the identification and
slaughter of affected herds, and by a vaccination strategy. AusSpread stores information
about exposure events, infection events, and control and surveillance events on individual
farms and provides summary outputs on a daily basis. The model also includes a module
that tracks samples collected for laboratory testing and estimates the direct control costs
and compensation payments. Outputs are provided in the form of tables, graphs, and maps.
2.2.2 Survey data collection
The data collection and survey analysis component was led by Dr. Bo Norby at Texas
9A&MUniversity. Using in-person interviews, data was collected from feedlots, beef herds,
dairies, and swine operations. Data collection included size of operation, animal move-
ments, contacts between different herd types, and seasonal variation in contacts and move-
ments.
2.2.3 AusSpread Model Assumptions
Based on the survey data, assumptions 1-4 were made for the AusSpread model.
Assumption 1 - Direct and Indirect Contacts
The contacts determined for each premises could be divided into those leaving the
premises, those coming to the premises, and indirect contacts. For direct contact, the per-
centage of animals from/to each possible contact premises was determined. The number of
days per month for each contact premises and the number of locations per day were also
ascertained. The direct-contact rate per month was determined for each premises, contact
type, and contact premises combination by multiplying the number of days per month ani-
mals were moved by the number of locations per day. The numbers of people and vehicles
that visited premises each month were determined, as was the number of premises that em-
ployees visited; this served as the indirect contact rate per month. Monthly contact rates
were converted to daily contact rates by dividing monthly contact rates by 30. The num-
ber of times that animals came from or were sent out of state was determined, as were the
state(s) involved. The frequency of horses and custom crews being used on premises was
also determined. Semen shipments were determined for dairies. For all livestock types,
the distances that animals and employees traveled between contacts were established. The
values shown in Table 1 were used for daily direct and indirect contacts by herd type.
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Table 1: Direct and Indirect Contact Rates by Herd Type
Farm Type Description Contacts DContacts IContacts PIDC PIIC
1 feedlot1 Company owned feedlot (>50,000 head) 45 0 45 0.95 0.2
2 feedlot2 Stockholder feedlot (>20,000 but less than 50,000) 33 0 33 .95 .2
3 feedlot3 Custom feedlot (>5,000 but less than 20,000) 23 0 23 .95 .2
4 feedlot4 Backgrounder feedlot 6 1 5 0.95 0.2
5 feedlot5 Yearling-pasture feedlot 6 1 5 0.95 .2
6 feedlot6 Dairy Calf-raiser feedlot 6 1 5 0.95 0.2
7 small beef <100 cattle 3.01 0.01 3 0.95 0.1
8 large beef > 100 cattle 5.1 0.1 5 0.95 0.1
9 small dairy <1000 number dairy cows 10.01 0.01 10 0.95 0.2
10 large dairy >1000 number dairy cows 20.1 0.1 20 0.95 0.2
11 backyard <10 cattle 5.01 0.01 5 0.9 0.15
12 small ruminant sheep and goats 5.1 0.1 5 0.9 0.17
13 swine pig concentrated animal feeding operations 11 1 10 1 1
key:Contacts = total number of contacts per day that could possibly result in transmission of FMD virus between herds
DContact (direct contacts) = total number of direct contacts per day; a direct contact was essentially the movement of livestock
between herds e.g. direct contact of 0.10 for large dairies implies that, on average, a cow/calf is introduced every 10 days.
IContact (indirect contacts) = total number of indirect contacts per day; indirect contacts are all those contacts between herds
that could transmit FMD virus, other than livestock movements. We assumed that people or equipment (such as vehicles and
veterinary and husbandry equipment e.g. ropes, needles) contaminated with FMD virus from an infected herd would be an
indirect contact if they potentially come in contact with livestock or where livestock are kept.
PIDC = probability of infection given a direct contact PIIC = probability of infection given an indirect contact
Once disease has been detected (day 7 or day 14, depending whether disease detection is assumed to be early or late) the number
of direct contacts was reduced by 80%; the number of indirect contacts was reduced by 50%
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Assumption 2 - Saleyards
Based on the survey data, the estimated number of buyers per sale was assumed to
be 100. It was assumed that 90% of sales were in-region, with 10% being out-of-region.
In-region buyers were assumed to travel to the sale a minimum of 10 km and a maximum
of 150 km. The probability of sending livestock to sale was assumed to be 20%, and
only herd types 7 and 8 (small and large beef) were assumed to sell livestock at sales.
The probability of buying livestock from a sale was assumed to be 20%. Herd types 1-
6, 7, 8, and 11 (company owned, stockholder, custom feedlot, backgrounder, yearling-
pasture, dairy calf-raiser, small beef, large beef, large dairy, and backyard, respectively)
were eligible to purchase from a sale. A saleyard was assumed to be infected if animals
from an infected herd were sent to sale. The saleyard was reset to uninfected status after
each sale. All saleyards were assumed to be shut down on day 8 or day 15 (depending
upon whether early or late detection was simulated) following an incursion of FMD (1 day
post-detection).
Assumption 3 - Airborne Spread
Airborne spread was assumed to be only possible from herd type 1 (company-owned
feedlot) and herd type 13 (swine facility). The probability of airborne spread was dependent
on temperature and humidity, and infection of herds depended on prevailing wind speed
and direction. Average monthly climatic parameters were derived from the climatic data
center weather station readings. The following assumptions were made for the proposed
identification of high-risk areas.
The following assumption were made for the proposal of identifying high risk area.
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Assumption 4 - The Best Mitigation Strategy Will Be Applied
According to the High Plains Project Report from the FAZD Center, the best miti-
gation strategy for epidemic length and number of herds is slaughter of infected animals,
regular surveillance, early detection, ring vaccination, and adequate vaccination.
Assumption 5 -Selected Initiation Points (Index Herds) and Runs
Single-site incursions at a large feedlot, small feedlot, large beef, and backyard herd
were used to initiate the epidemic for best mitigation strategy. For each simulation, at least
100 runs were required. For the simulation experiment, the total sample (N) is n by r; the
type of randomization is complete randomized design (CRD); the type of the factors type
of herds (T) is random; experimental units (EU) is measurement units (MU), which is EU
= MU = individual simulation run; and the sources of variation is the types of herds and
stochastic simulation runs.
2.3 Spatial Regression Analysis and Prediction
In epidemiologic research, there are two approaches, logistic regression and Poisson
regression, that are widely used to model count outcomes.
2.3.1 Poisson Regression
Suppose that we observe binary outcomes yi,k from an Ausspread similation model,
where yi,k= 1 indicates the presence of the FMD disease in premises i and the kth run given
a fixed start point, saying that S(0), {k=1,2...100}and yi,k = 0 denotes its absence. Let pi
denote the (unknown) probability of disease prevalence in the population under study. The
13
random variable yi,k follows a Bernoulli distribution with a probability of disease pi. The
joint probability associated with the observed data y1,k, ..., yn,k is
f(y1,k, ..., yn,k; pi) =
n∏
i=1
piyi,k(1− pi)1−yi,k
= exp[
n∑
i=1
log(1− pi) +
n∑
i=1
yi,klog(
pi
1− pi )]
(2.1)
Here, E(yi,k) = pi, the canonical link is g(E(yi,k)) = g(pi) = log[pi/(1 − pi)], known
as the logit link. Logistic regression represents the GLM based on a Bernoulli random
component and the logit link; that is, for covariates x1, ..., xp
log[
pi
1− pi ] = β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βpxp
= Xβ
(2.2)
A Poisson approximation of the binomial distribution is often used in modeling count
data when n is large and npi is small-for example, for a rare disease. The Poisson distri-
bution also arises from modeling observed point locations as random events. A Poisson
regression approach models the expected value as a function of regional covariates:
log[E(Yi)] = Xβ
E(Yi) = exp(Xβ)
(2.3)
In equation 2.3, Yi =
∑100
k yi,k is the number of FMD disease samples present from
100 random simulations in the ith premises given start point S(0). X is a vector including
Dis0,i, the distance between the start point, S(0),, and the ith premises, and cattle number
CNi for the ith premises. Further, assume that the count results are a linear combination of
14
polynomial functions of the distance variable with degree r. That is,
log[E(Yi)] = Xβ
= γCNi +
∑
r
βiDis
r
0,i
(2.4)
where degree r can be determined by corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc) and
Bayesian information criterion(BIC) including here
1. Corrected Akaike Information Criterion
AICc=k 2n
(n−k−1) -2ln(likelihood)
2. Bayesian Information Criterion ,
BIC=kln(N)-2ln(likelihood)
where k is the number of parameters and N is the number of observations.
2.3.2 Overdispersion
It has long been recognized that the Poisson distributional assumption imposes re-
strictions on the conditional moments of y that are often violated in applications. The most
important of these is equality of the conditional variance and mean:
E(Yi|x) = V ar(Yi|x)
A weaker assumption allows the variance-mean ratio to be any positive constant
E(Yi|x) = σ2V ar(Yi|x)
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When σ2 > 1 it implies that the variance is greater than the mean; This situation is called
overdispersion, and thus the standard error estimated from this model will be low (Waller
and Gotway, 2004).
In the poisson regression model, the variance of the data depends on the mean, and
thus the variance-covariance matrix of the data Y is
Σ = var(Y ) = σ2Vµ (2.5)
where Vµ is an N × N diagonal matrix with the variance function terms on the diago-
nal, and the parameter σ2 allowing for ”inexactness” in the variance-to-mean relationships
called overdispersion. The variance-covariance matrix defined in equation ( 2.5) is a gen-
eralization of the variance-covariance matrix assumed for linear regression models with
uncorrelated residuals (Waller and Gotway, 2004). This model can be written as
log(Y ) = Xβ
with
var(Y ) = σ2Vµ (2.6)
2.3.3 Parameter Estimation
In general, this model with adjustment for overdispersion, can be written as
log(Y ) = Xβ
with
var(Y ) = σ2Vµ (2.7)
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Wolfinger and O’Connell (1993)(Wolfinger and O’Connell, 1993) suggest an approach
termed pseudolikelihood (PL) as a flexible and efficient way of estimating the unknown pa-
rameters in a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM). The procedure was described as
follows
1. Obtain a starting estimate of β, say βˆ.
2. Compute residuals r = Y −Xβˆ.
3. Estimate the correspondingly, Σaˆ
4. Obtain a new estimate of β using
β = βˆgls = (X
′Σ−1aˆ X)
−1X ′Σ−1aˆ Y .
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until |βˆn − βˆn−1| < β and |aˆn − aˆn−1| < a
2.3.4 Spatial Prediction
After the parameters are estimated, we can assume any premises as a start point and
predict the number of events for other premises by the estimated parameters. Next, repeat
this procedure until all premises have been used as the start point once. Finally, count and
sum all prediction results and calculate the mean for each premises. In other words, this
way seems like we mimic simulations according to existing results of the Ausspead model
using all premises as the start point, then count the number of FMDs present for each. The
following is the procedure:
• Order premises by ID number from the smallest to the largest, number it 1...n.
• Assume premises 1 as the start point, and compute the distance between premises 1
and the rest of the premises.
• Predict the probability of being infected when FMD disease is introduced into premises
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1 for all premises using the equation
yˆ1,i = exp(γCNi +
∑
r βiDis
r
1,i)
whereDis1,i is the distance between the 1st start point and the ith premises and CNi
is the cattle number in ith premises.
• Select premises 2 as the start point, repeat the procedure, then premises 3 until
premise n;
• Compute the expected number of each premises’disease present by the equation:
Eyˆi = ¯ˆyj,i =
1
n
∑n
j=1 yˆj,i
2.4 Procedure
Data from the AUSSPREAD simulation model were used in this phase, in which there
were 100 runs under each scenario. Across the 100 random trials, the number of events for
each premises was counted using the SAS SQL function. The count outcome was then used
as the dependent variable in a Poisson regression with adjustment for overdispersion. The
independent variables were then
• The number of animal in each premises’acreage.
• Distance of the premises’ from the disease initiation point calculated based on longi-
tudes (x) and latitudes (y) via the Euclidean distance equation:
dis0,i =
√
(x0 − xi)2 + (y0 − yi)2.
where x and y are coordinators.
We selected four different scenarios: an FMD disease introduced from large feedlots,
small feedlots, large beef, and backyard. For each scenario, we used a spatial regression
model to estimate the parameters of the model given one location as the start point, then, ac-
18
cording to the estimated parameters, we predicted the probability/risk of an FMD outbreak
spreading to the premises given others as the start points in the study area.
2.4.1 Scenario 1
2.4.1.1 Parameter Estimation
In scenario 1, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large feedlots. We used a
Poisson regression model with adjustment for dispersion to determine the polynomial de-
gree r. Table 2 summarizes the estimation results for that parameter and shows fits obtained
via AICc and BIC for r values from 1 to 3. Table 2 shows that r = 3 with minimum AICc,
and BIC exhibits significantly better fit than that (r = 1 and r = 3). The dispersion parameter
was estimated as 7.9280, with a standard error of 0.1516, significantly different from one,
implying overdispersion. Thus, this model can be written as:
log[E(Yi)] = 3.7326 + 0.008184CNi − 0.2324Dis0,i + 0.00623Dis20,i − 0.00005Dis30,i
with
var(Y |X) = 7.9280Vµ (2.8)
From Table 2, as we expected, animal number has a significant positive impact on the
possibility of an outbreak reaching a premises. The estimated parameter is 0.00818, imply-
ing that when the animal number increases by 1,000 the probability of being infected will
increase 0.35%. The distance from the start point has a negative impact. The relationship
between distance and outbreak probability for a single premises, keeping animal density
constant, is plotted in panel 1 of Fig. 2. The figure indicates that distance has a larger
negative impact on the number of events when distance is shorter (absolute value of slope
is large), while this impact is tiny when distance is more than 20 miles (absolute value of
slope is close to zero).
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Table 2: Parameter Estimation under Scenario 1
r=1 r=2 r=3
Parameters Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Intercept 1.9961 0.04796 2.7040 0.0608 3.7326 0.07341
CN 0.01761 0.00532 0.0152 0.0045 0.0081 0.00412
Dis -0.01958 0.00140 -0.0749 0.0039 -0.2324 0.0093
Dis2 0.0008 0.00005 0.0062 0.00031
Dis3 -0.00005 2.96E-06
Dispersion(σ2) 10.6908 8.4344 7.9280
SD of σ2 0.2044 0.1613 0.1516
AICc 21356.4 20212.4 20064.2
BIC 21363.1 20219.0 20070.8
Observations 5474 5474 5474
Note: CN is cattle number in each premises.
Dis is the distance between the premises and the disease initiation point.
σ2 is the dispersion parameter.
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Figure 2: Estimated Distance Impact on Possibility of Disease Present
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2.4.1.2 Prediction and Results
Using parameters estimated in Table 2, we select all 58 large feedlots as start points.
For example, in those 58 large feedlots, when the jth large feedlot is selected as a start point,
the number of ith premises’ disease present can be predicted by the following procedure.
• Order large feedlots by ID number from the smallest to the largest, and number them
1...58.
• Select large feedlot 1 as a start point; compute the distance between large feedlot 1
and the rest of the premises.
• Predict the probability of being infected when FMD disease is introduced into large
feedlot 1 for all premises by the equation
yˆj,i = exp(3.7326+0.008184CNi− 0.2324Disj,i+0.00623Dis2j,i− 0.00005Dis3j,i)
where Dis1,i is distance between 1st start point and ith premise and CNi is cattle
number in ith premise.
• Select large feedlots 2 as start point, repeat the procedure, then large feedlots 3 till
large feedlots 58;
• Compute the expected number of each premise disease present by equation:
Eyˆi = ¯ˆyj,i =
1
n
∑n
j=1 yˆj,i
where n=58.
The predicted results are mapped and presented in Fig. 3. For easier reading of the re-
sults, we transformed the discrete points into a continuous surface by the ordinary Kringing
interpolation technique. Dark brown represents higher probability, while light yellow rep-
resents lower probability. According to the map, the southeast of Deaf Smith and the west
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of Castro County have approximately a 10% possibility of presenting disease when one
FMD virus is randomly introduced into large feedlots in the study area, while other areas
are predicted to have lower probabilities. For example, most areas of Randall county are
estimated to have approximately a 2-3% possibility of presenting disease. Since the cattle
number plays a critical role in expected animal loss, the expected animal loss provides a
different picture, which is computed by
ECLi = yˆi × CNiand
TECLi =
∑n
i ECLi
Figure 4 shows the high loss area in Castro, Pamper, and Deaf Smith Counties because
of the large feedlots concentrated in those three counties. The total estimated expected
cattle loss is more than 141,000 under scenario 1, in which an FMD virus is randomly
introduced into large feedlots.
2.4.2 Scenario 2
2.4.2.1 Parameter Estimation
In scenario 2, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in small feedlots. We used
a Poisson regression model with adjustment for dispersion to determine the polynomial de-
gree r. Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for that parameter and shows fits obtained
via AICc and BIC for r values from 1 to 3. Table 3 shows that r = 3 with minimum AICc,
and that BIC exhibits significantly better fit than that of r = 1 and r = 2. The dispersion
parameter was estimated as 1.4760, with a standard error of 0.03072, which is significantly
different from one, implying slight overdispersion. Thus, this model can be written as:
log[E(Yi)] = 5.5067 + 0.00675CNi − 0.5391Dis0,i + 0.01730Dis20,i − 0.00017Dis30,i
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Figure 3: Predicted Probability Distribution under Scenario 1
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Figure 4: The Expected Cattle Loss Distribution under Scenario 1
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Table 3: Parameter Estimation under Scenario 2
r=1 r=2 r=3
Parameters Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Intercept 3.6479 0.04065 4.6665 0.02422 5.5067 0.02153
CN 0.000148 0.006907 0.002260 0.004443 0.00675 0.003199
Dis -0.1028 0.001988 -0.2569 0.0024621 -0.5391 0.005574
Dis2 0.003537 0.000045 0.01730 0.000263
Dis3 -0.00017 3.298E-6
Dispersion(σ2) 6.9599 2.5777 1.4760
SD of σ2 0.1448 0.05364 0.03072
AICc 19441.2 14773.9 11976.3
BIC 19447.6 14780.4 11982.7
Observations 4623 4623 4623
Note: CN is cattle number in each premises.
Dis is the distance between the premises and the disease initiation point.
σ2 is the dispersion parameter.
with
var(Y |X) = 1.4760Vµ (2.9)
From Table 3, as we expected, animal number has a significant positive impact on
the possibility of an outbreak reaching a premises. The estimated parameter is 0.00675,
implying that when the animal number increases by 1,000 the probability will increase with
an exponential function with cattle number, exp(0.00675*CN). The distance from the start
point has a negative impact. The relationship between distance and outbreak probability
for a single premises, keeping animal density constant, is plotted in panel 2 of Fig. 2, which
indicates that distance has a larger negative impact on the number of events when distance
is shorter, while this impact is tiny when distance is more than 20 miles.
2.4.2.2 Prediction and Results
Similarly, using parameters estimated in Table 3, we select all 26 small feedlots as
start points. The predicted results from a similar procedure were mapped and presented
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in Fig. 5. According to the map, the southeast of Deaf Smith County and the southwest
of Castro County represent a little over 10% possibility of presenting disease when one
FMD virus is randomly introduced into small feedlots in the study area, while other areas
are predicted to have lower probabilities. For example, most areas of Hale County are
estimated to have approximately a 1-2% possibility of presenting disease. Figure 6 shows
the high-cattle-loss area in Deaf Smith and the western part of Castro County. Again, a
total estimated expected cattle loss is more than 137,000 under scenario 2, with an FMD
virus randomly introduced into small feedlots, which is slightly lower than under scenario
1.
2.4.3 Scenario 3
2.4.3.1 Parameter Estimation
In scenario 3, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large beef. Table 4
summarizes the estimation results for that parameter and shows fits obtained via AICc and
BIC for r values from 1 to 3. Table 4 shows that r = 3 with minimum AICc and BIC exhibits
significantly better fit than that of r = 1 and r = 2. The dispersion parameter was estimated
as 1.0341, with a standard error of 0.02930, which is insignificantly different from one,
implying no dispersion. Thus, this model can be written as:
log[E(Yi)] = 5.1048 + 0.0127CNi − 0.3523Dis0,i + 0.008453Dis20,i − 0.00006Dis30,i
with
var(Y |X) = 1.0341Vµ (2.10)
From Table 4, as we expected, animal number has a significant positive impact on
the possibility of an outbreak reaching a premises. The estimated parameter is 0.0127,
implying that when the animal number increases by 1,000 the probability will increase by
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Figure 5: Predicted Probability Distribution under Scenario 2
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Figure 6: The Expected Cattle Loss Distribution under Scenario 2
29
Table 4: Parameter Estimation under Scenario 3
r=1 r=2 r=3
Parameters Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Intercept 2.7757 0.05843 4.0823 0.04352 5.1048 0.03458
CN 0.003134 0.005387 0.008719 0.003709 0.0127 0.002795
Dis -0.05114 0.001744 -0.1501 0.002670 -0.3523 0.005057
Dis2 0.001379 0.000033 0.008453 0.000170
Dis3 -0.00006 1.546E-6
Dispersion(σ2) 3.8852 1.8788 1.0341
SD of σ2 0.1100 0.05323 0.02930
AICc 9051.0 7210.8 5786.7
BIC 9056.9 7216.6 5792.5
Observations 2496 2496 2496
Note: CN is cattle number in each premises.
Dis is the distance between the premises and the disease initiation point.
σ2 is the dispersion parameter.
an exponential function with cattle number, exp(0.0127*CN). The distance from the start
point has a negative impact. The relationship between distance and outbreak probability
for a single premises, keeping animal density constant, is plotted in panel 3 of Fig. 2, which
indicates that distance has a larger negative impact on the number of events when distance
is shorter, while this impact is tiny when distance is more than 20 miles.
2.4.3.2 Prediction and Results
Similarly, using the parameters estimated in Table 4, we select all 740 large beef as
start points. The predicted results from a similar procedure were mapped and presented in
Fig. 7. According to the map, the high-risk areas concentrate in Parmer County, with an
8-10 % possibility of presenting disease when one FMD virus is randomly introduced into
large beef in the study area, while other areas are predicted to have lower probabilities; for
example, most areas of Bailey, Castro, and Hale Counties are estimated to have approxi-
mately a 1-2% possibility of presenting disease. Figure 8 shows the high cattle loss area
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in Deaf Smith, Parmer, and the west of Castro County. Again, a total estimated expected
cattle loss is more than 150,000 under scenario 3, with an FMD virus randomly introduced
into large beef, which is slightly lower than those under scenarios 1 and 2.
2.4.4 Scenario 4
2.4.4.1 Parameter Estimation
In scenario 4, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in backyard. Table 5 sum-
marizes the estimation results for that parameter and shows fits obtained via AICc and BIC
for r values from 1 to 3. Table 5 shows that r = 3 with minimum AICc and BIC exhibits
significantly better fit than that of r = 1 and r = 2. The dispersion parameter was estimated
as 1.0341, with a standard error of 0.02930, which is significantly less than one, implying
underdispersion. Thus, this model can be written as:
log[E(Yi)] = 4.8847 + 0.00217CNi − 0.3306Dis0,i + 0.007472Dis20,i − 0.00005Dis30,i
with
var(Y |X) = 0.8893Vµ (2.11)
From Table 5, as we expected, animal number has a significant positive impact on the
possibility of an outbreak reaching a premises. The estimated parameter is 0.00217, but it
is insignificant. The distance from the start point has a negative impact. The relationship
between distance and outbreak probability for a single premises, keeping animal density
constant, is plotted in panel 4 of Fig. 2, which indicates that distance has a larger negative
impact on the number of events when distance is shorter, while this impact is tiny when
distance is more than 20 miles.
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Figure 7: Predicted Probability Distribution under Scenario 3
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Figure 8: The Expected Cattle Loss Distribution under Scenario 3
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Table 5: Parameter Estimation under Scenario 4
r=1 r=2 r=3
Parameters Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Intercept 2.8910 0.04301 4.1790 0.02851 4.8847 0.02289
CN -0.01468 0.01317 0.002355 0.007721 0.002170 0.005806
Dis -0.05425 0.001238 -0.1645 0.001908 -0.3306 0.003699
Dis2 0.001559 0.000024 0.007472 0.000126
Dis3 -0.00005 1.16E-6
Dispersion(σ2) 3.6251 1.4614 0.8893
SD of σ2 0.08229 0.03318 0.02019
AICc 14676.4 11140.9 9045.0
BIC 14682.6 11147.2 9051.3
Observations 3884 3884 3884
Note: CN is cattle number in each premises.
Dis is the distance between the premises and the disease initiation point.
σ2 is the dispersion parameter.
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2.4.4.2 Prediction and Results
Similarly, using the parameters estimated in Table 5, we select all 620 backyards as
start points. The predicted results from a similar procedure were mapped and presented in
Fig. 9. According to the map, the high-risk areas are concentrated in Lamb and Swisher
Counties, with a 5-7% possibility of presenting disease when one FMD virus is randomly
introduced into backyards in the study area, while other areas are predicted with lower
probability-for example, other counties are estimated to have approximately a 1-2% pos-
sibility of presenting disease. Figure 10 shows the high-cattle-loss area in Deaf Smith,
Parmer, and the west of Castro County. Again, the total estimated expected cattle loss is
more than 88,000 under scenario 4, with an FMD virus randomly introduced into large
beef, which is much lower than those under scenarios 1-3.
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Figure 9: Predicted Probability Distribution under Scenario 4
36
Figure 10: The Expected Animal Loss Distribution under Scenario 4
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we use a Poisson regression model with adjustment dispersion associ-
ated with random simulation results from the AusSpead model to estimate the parameters
of the model given one location as the start point in the simulation, and we predicted the
probability/risk and expected cattle loss of an FMD outbreak spreading to the premises
given others as start points under different scenarios in the study area.
Table 6 summarizes the estimated results under four different scenarios. Cattle num-
bers have a positive effect on the probability of being infected, while the distance between
the start point and a given premises has a negative effect. Under different scenarios, the im-
pact is slightly different. Because of the marginal impact of distance on probability in the
Poisson model with a high-order polynomial function, it is difficult to obtain the marginal
impact; we plot the relationship between distance and probability. Figure 2 shows that
distance has a similar negative impact on the number of events under the four different
scenarios. That is, when distance is shorter-while this impact is tiny when distance is more
than 20 miles or when the premises are far from the start point (over 20 miles)-the impact is
the same regardless of the distance. In other words, if the distance between a premises and
an outbreak point is shorter than 20 miles, the ”marginal” impact of distance will steeply
rise when distance decreases, while if the distance between a premises and the outbreak
point is longer than 20 miles, an increase or decrease in distance will not impact the prob-
ability.
It is clear that because distance plays a important role in predicting event probability,
as return, identifying high-risk areas depends on the spatial distributions of premises, and
high density of premises usually has high probability of transmission of the virus or be-
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coming infected. The total expected cattle loss plays an important role in decision making.
When FMD hits large premises-for example, large feedlots or large beef-a large cattle loss
will occur. Based on the AusSpead simulation model, our estimation and prediction show
that large cattle loss is concentrated in three counties-Deaf Smith, Parmer, and Castro-
those results are from approximately 70% feedlots with over 10,000 cattle located in the
three counties. When an FMD virus is introduced into backyard, the expected loss is about
88,000 head, while when an FMD virus is introduced into large or small feedlots or large
beef the losses are approximately double. They are 141, 137, and 150 thousand head,
respectively.
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Table 6: Summary of Parameter Estimation under Different Scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Parameters Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept 3.7326 < .0001 5.5067 < .0001 5.1048 < .0001 4.9051 < .0001
CN 0.008184 .0475 0.006752 0.0348 0.0127 < .0001 0.002192 .70
Dis -0.2324 < .0001 -0.5391 < .0001 -0.3523 < .0001 -0.333 < .0001
Dis2 0.00623 < .0001 0.0173 < .0001 0.008453 < .0001 0.007538 < .0001
Dis3 -0.00005 < .0001 -0.00017 < .0001 -0.00006 < .0001 -0.00005 < .0001
Dispersion(σ2) 7.928 1.476 1.0341 0.8893
SD of σ2 0.1516 0.03072 0.02930 0.02019
Observations 5474 4623 2496 3884
Total cattle loss 141,033 137,728 150,021 88,407
Note: CN is cattle number in each premises.
Dis is the distance between the premises and the disease initiation point.
σ2 is the dispersion parameter.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYZING ANIMAL CARCASS DISPOSAL COSTS
3.1 Introduction
Foot and mouth disease is highly contagious and one of the most economically costly
diseases affecting livestock. The 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom demon-
strated the need for effective disease control and eradication strategies and carcass disposal
to minimize event costs. Various methods are possible, and preplanning should consider
these methods based on their potential feasibility and cost effectiveness. A potential major
outbreak of FMD in the United States would involve mass slaughter and disposal of animal
carcasses because U.S. livestock are completely susceptible to this disease. Whether at the
hand of accidental disease entry, typical animal-production mortality, natural disaster, or
an act of terrorism, livestock deaths pose daunting carcass-disposal challenges. Effective
means of carcass disposal are perhaps most crucial for disease eradication efforts. Rapid
slaughter and disposal of livestock are integral parts of effective disease eradication strate-
gies.
During 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak, more than six million animals were slaughtered:
over four million for disease control purposes, and over two million for welfare reasons.
The sheer scale of the epidemic made disposal a critical problem. On infected premises,
disposal speeds were particularly slow until the third week of April 2001, when, for the first
time, disposal was completed on more than half of infected premises within 24 hours of
slaughter (Fig. 11). Until then, the daily totals for slaughtering had run ahead of disposals.
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Figure 11: Elapsed Time between Completion of Slaughter and Disposal for Infected
Premises during the 2001 Outbreak
On between a quarter and a third of infected premises, slaughtered animals were left lying
on the ground for four days or more during these first seven weeks of the epidemic. As a
result, the number of slaughtered animals awaiting disposal on infected premises increased
rapidly, peaking at 140,000 on April 1, 2001 (Fig. 12). The number on dangerous contact
premises peaked at 169,000 on April 14 (National Audit Office (NAO): The 2001 Outbreak
of Foot and Mouth Disease).
The 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K. resulted in carcass disposal costs of £ 3 bil-
lion (US$4.2 billion)to the government, of which carcass disposal cost was approximately
£ 164 (US$230) million, or 5.5% of the total government cost of the outbreak (Fig. 13).
During the 1997 FMD outbreak in Taiwan, when approximately 3.8 million animals were
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Figure 12: Animals Slaughtered, Disposed of and Awaiting Disposal by Week during the
2001 Outbreak
slaughtered and disposed of, the costs borne by the government associated with the epi-
demic were estimated at US$187.5 million, with carcass disposal costing approximately
$24.6 million, or about 13% of total government cost.
Realization of a rapid response requires emergency management plans that are rooted
in a thorough understanding of disposal alternatives. Strategies for carcass disposal-especially
large-scale carcass disposal-require preparation well in advance of an emergency in order
to maximize the efficiency of response. The most effective disposal strategies will be those
that exploit every available and suitable disposal option to the fullest extent possible, re-
gardless of what those options might be. It may seem straightforward, or even tempting, to
suggest a step-wise disposal option hierarchy outlining the most and least preferred meth-
ods of disposal. However, for a multi-dimensional enterprise such as carcass disposal,
hierarchies may be of limited value because they are incapable of fully capturing and sys-
tematizing the relevant dimensions at stake (e.g., environmental considerations, disease
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Figure 13: Direct Cost to the Public Sector of the 2001 Outbreak of FMD
agent considerations, availability of technology, cost, etc.). Even with a disposal-option hi-
erarchy that, for example, ranks the most environmentally preferred disposal technologies
for a particular disease, difficulties arise when the most preferred methods are not available
or when capacity has been exhausted. In these situations, decision makers may have to con-
sider the least preferred means. In such a scenario (one that is likely to occur in the midst
of an emergency), there are tremendous benefits to being armed with a comprehensive un-
derstanding of an array of carcass-disposal technologies. Decision makers should come to
understand each disposal technology available to them, thereby equipping themselves with
a comprehensive toolkit of knowledge. Such awareness implies an understanding of an ar-
ray of factors for each technology, including the principles of operation, logistical details,
personnel requirements, likely costs, environmental considerations, disease agent consid-
erations, advantages and disadvantages, and lessons learned for each technology. In the
absence of a wealth of observable data on FMD outbreaks, disease modeling is the main
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tool for predicting the likely spread of the disease and for evaluating the effectiveness of
various mitigation strategies (Bates et al., 2003).
In this chapter, our aims are to determine the best mitigation strategies with average
minimum animal loss and under the best strategy. We make preparation for the ”worst” sta-
tus, estimating costs of disposing of animal carcasses and transportation following a largest
FMD outbreak under four different scenarios, and we examine the effectiveness of disposal
strategies. To achieve the goal, we test 15 mitigation strategies based on simulation results
by multiple comparison and the best strategy group, then we select one of the best mitiga-
tion strategies for the four different scenarios and estimate minimum costs of disposing of
animal carcasses and transportation.
3.2 Experimental Design and Test
3.2.1 Experimental Design Description
The data collected and the experimental design were described in Chapter I. Here, we
only describe the fifteen mitigation strategies, which are provided in Table 7.
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Table 7: Mitigation Strategy
Strategy Description
1 Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, early detection
2 Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection
3 Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine
4 Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine
5 Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, early detection
6 Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection
7 Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection,targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine
8 Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, late detection,targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine
9 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, ring vaccination,early detection, inadequate vaccine
10 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, early detection
11 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, late detection, ring vaccination, adequate vaccine
12 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, early detection, targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine
13 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, late detection
14 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, late detection, targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine
15 Slaughter of infecteds, slaughter of dc’s, regular surveillance, early detection, ring vaccination, adequate vaccine
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3.2.2 Test the Best Strategies
The number and type of animals lost were calculated according to herd status as gener-
ated by the AusSpread epidemic model, coupled with information on herd size. Herds with
the status of infected, dead, immune, or latent were counted toward lost value. Losses by
animal type were calculated by multiplying size by animal type distribution. This measure
was summed for all herds slaughtered.
3.2.2.1 Scenario 1
In scenario 1, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large feedlots. Fifteen
strategies were tested, and each strategy was given 100 runs, with all animal loss for each
run being summed. A total of 100 observations were obtained. We used the Tukey test,
probably the most conservative multiple-comparison test, controlled at a significance level
of 5%. Table 8 provides the mean and standard deviation and test results. The groups
with the same letter are insignificantly different. For example, strategies 7, 15, and 3, with
average animal losses over 100 runs being 989,844; 977,007; and 917,307, respectively,
have the same letter A, indicating that the three strategies cause insignificant differences in
animal loss at the 5% level. Strategy 3 also has letter B, as with strategies 4 and 8, indicating
that strategy 3 also is insignificantly different from strategies 4 and 8 in animal loss at 5%.
But strategies 4 and 8 are indeed better than strategies 7 and 15, with significantly less
animal loss. Overall, the best strategies are 15, 9, 1, 10, and 5, with the least animal loss
(121,029; 117,262; 101,205; 97,374; and 96,105, respectively).
3.2.2.2 Scenario 2
In scenario 2, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in small feedlots. Similar
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Table 8: Multiple Comparison for Animal Loss under Scenario 1
Group strategy observations Mean Standard Deviation
A 7 100 989844 312690.005
A 15 100 977007 357182.846
B A 3 100 917307 326094.017
B 4 100 862727 327190.377
B 8 100 831726 342778.246
C 12 100 442401 225067.29
D 11 100 231375 87213.237
E D 6 100 178570 70821.63
E D 13 100 170126 73038.509
E D 2 100 166746 65413.011
E 15 100 121029 56677.659
E 9 100 117262 82946.118
E 1 100 101205 52834.904
E 10 100 97374 41549.85
E 5 100 96105 43137.801
note: Group with the same letter are not significantly different
to the above, we summed all animal losses for each run. A total of 100 observations were
obtained, and Table 9 provides the mean and standard deviation and test results. Overall,
the best strategies are 11,15, 2,13, 6, 9, 1, 10, and 5, with the least animal losses (95,987;
71,129; 58,753; 56,454; 54,916; 40,665; 39,169; 37,263; and 36,458, respectively).
3.2.2.3 Scenario 3
In scenario 3, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large beef. Similarly,
we summed all animal losses for each run. A total of 100 observations were obtained,
and Table 10 provides the mean and standard deviation and test results. Overall, the best
strategies are 11, 15, 2, 13, 6, 9, 1, 10, and 5, with the least animal losses (95,987; 71,129;
58,753; 56,454; 54,916; 40,665; 39,169; 37,263; and 36,458, respectively).
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Table 9: Multiple Comparison for Animal Loss under Scenario 2
Group strategy observations Mean Standard Deviation
A 3 100 451463 311225.154
A 7 100 413217 287281.042
B A 14 100 396657 258376.865
B C 12 100 318849 230757.705
D C 4 100 276745 289937.633
D 8 100 225086 262870.659
E 11 100 95987 65544.36
E 15 100 71129 60432.163
E 2 100 58753 51104.354
E 13 100 56454 47791.215
E 6 100 54916 49765.921
E 9 100 40665 50880.178
E 1 100 39169 37318.808
E 10 100 37263 33688.635
E 5 100 36458 31974.882
note: Group with the same letter are not significantly different
Table 10: Multiple Comparison for Animal Loss under Scenario 3
Group strategy observations Mean Standard Deviation
A 7 100 308553 315149.249
A 14 100 302730 332409.258
A 3 100 300179 320838.347
B 12 100 140986 236813.119
B 8 100 129991 229858.856
C B 4 100 86696 149354.192
C 11 100 68167 77997.098
C 6 100 42263 63751.681
C 15 100 40342 58704.475
C 13 100 38559 55124.221
C 2 100 37080 54589.334
C 10 100 26733 51507.085
C 5 100 26589 51406.694
C 1 100 25826 50975.511
C 9 100 22428 57356.944
note: Group with the same letter are not significantly different
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Table 11: Multiple Comparison for Animal Loss under Scenario 4
Group strategy observations Mean Standard Deviation
A 7 100 395905 282432.105
A 14 100 393286 305831.542
A 3 100 388452 290022.594
B 12 100 225179 173062.807
B 4 100 191224 307853.446
B 8 100 160615 261511.797
C 11 100 57380 86449.064
C 2 100 27558 47589.386
C 13 100 21671 35253.466
C 6 100 21344 43633.679
C 15 100 15044 30688.515
C 1 100 6633 16134.465
C 10 100 6094 15413.911
C 5 100 5607 14649.484
C 9 100 4463 20168.639
note: Group with the same letter are not significantly different
3.2.2.4 Scenario 4
Similarly, in scenario 4, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in backyard.
According to Table 11, the best strategies are 11, 2, 13, 6, 15, 1, 10, 5, and 9, with the least
animal loss.
Overall, according to Tables 8- 11, the best mitigation strategies for all four scenarios
are strategies 1, 5, 9, 10, and 15, with common strategy regular surveillance, slaughter of
the infected animals, and early detection. In the following sections, we will use one of
the best strategies, strategy 15, with ”worst” or largest animal loss to estimate the costs
of disposing of animal carcasses and transportation under four different scenarios and to
examine the effectiveness of the disposal strategies.
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Figure 14: Main Disposal Methods Used during the 2001 Outbreak
3.3 Carcass Disposal Options
During the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak, the most commonly used methods during the
whole epidemic were burning (29%) ,rendering (28%), landfill (22%), burial (18%) and
(Other (2%) (Fig. 14), while during the 1997 Taiwan FMD outbreak, 5% of the carcasses
were disposed of with open burning or incineration, 15% with rendering , and 80% by
burial and public landfill (Ellis, 2006). Thus, there are several options in the study area,
including incineration, composting, rendering, and burial.
3.3.1 Incineration
Incineration has historically played an important role in carcass disposal. During the
2001 U.K. FMD outbreak, about 29% of the carcasses were disposed of by incineration.
Advances in science and technology, increased awareness of public health, growing con-
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cerns about the environment, and evolving economic circumstances have all affected the
application of incineration to carcass disposal. There are three broad categories of incin-
eration techniques: open-air burning, fixed-facility incineration, and air-curtain incinera-
tion. Incineration is a viable way of disposing of animal carcasses. When incineration is
complete, all disease-causing organisms are destroyed. The byproduct of the incineration
process is ash, which can be land applied or buried.Direct variable cost associated with
incineration is about $55.40 per mortality.
There are no general cost estimates of indirect costs associated with incineration.
However, we need to consider (Mukhtar et al., 2008): environmental impacts, including
the release of noxious gases and compounds, including dioxins; smoke and odor emission;
disturbances due to operation of heavy machinery and trucks; soil disturbances, which typ-
ically increase the potential for erosion, and soil erosion from thermal sites, which may
carry contaminants resulting in severe off-site impacts; impacts on water quality due to
runoff from stored animals or process residues that might carry sediments and materi-
als washed off equipment, and negative impacts on wildlife; additional costs of disease
management from spread during transport and storage of animal carcasses; potential lost
tourism if the thermal destruction becomes widely publicized; and movement restrictions
on people and vehicles. There may also be indirect costs resulting from public opposition
to the use of mass thermal sites, including legal fees (e.g., a best practices and guidelines
for contaminated plant and animal disposal citation).
3.3.2 Rendering
Rendering is acceptable for disposing of livestock mortalities in Texas. It is the
most effective means of minimizing human exposure to biological and chemical hazards
when disposing of mortalities; proper rendering at temperatures that reach 295 0F kills all
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pathogens (U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 2003). Moreover, rendering recy-
cles the animal carcasses into useful byproducts (such as fatty acids, bone meal, and soap)
by grinding the carcasses, cooking the grounds, and separating the liquid tallow (fat) from
the solid material. Six rendering plants exist in the study area of Texas with relatively small
capacity, increasing the likelihood that the mortalities will be out of range of the rendering
facilities. Direct variable cost associated with rendering is about $60.68 per mortality.
3.3.3 Composting
Composting is an approved and potentially inexpensive way of disposing of livestock
mortalities. If done correctly, composting can destroy many disease-causing organisms
on site, eliminating potential for disease transmission off site. However, composting on
a large scale increases the potential for disease transfer from one site to another, because
wild or feral animals may dig into the compost and become a vector that can spread the dis-
ease. The byproduct of composting is a nutrient-rich material applicable to crop-producing
areas.Direct variable cost association with composting is about $58.8 per mortality.
There are no general cost estimates of indirect costs associated with composting. How-
ever, we need to consider (Mukhtar et al., 2008) environmental impacts, including odor
emissions; disturbances due to operation of heavy machinery and trucks; soil disturbances
that typically increase the potential for erosion, and soil erosion from composting sites that
may carry contaminants resulting in severe off-site impacts; impacts on water quality due
to runoff from stored animals or process residues that might carry sediments and materials
washed off equipment; negative impacts on wildlife; additional costs of disease manage-
ment from spread during transport and storage of animal carcasses; potential lost tourism if
the composting becomes widely publicized; movement restrictions on people and vehicles;
the negative impacts on the landscape and subsequent intended use of the composting site
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due to the potential change in allowed land use or vegetation; indirect cost resulting from
public opposition to the use of mass composting sites, including legal fees; and additional
costs to keep birds, flies and other insects, vermin, and scavenging animals (as the most im-
portant carriers of disease micro-organisms) away from the compost piles (best practices
and guidelines for contaminated plant and animal disposal citation may result).
3.3.4 Burial
Burial is a common practice and is often the disposal method of choice for catastrophic
livestock losses. Burying the animals on site as soon as possible after death dramatically
lowers the possibility of a disease spreading to other areas of the state. Advantages of the
burial method include cost effectiveness and security. Disadvantages of the burial method
include difficulty in winter and the potential contamination of groundwater or surface wa-
ters with chemical products of carcass decay. Direct variable cost associated with burial is
about $40 per ton (again, best practices and guidelines for contaminated plant and animal
disposal citation may result). However, because of the high environmental cost, finally we
assume the total cost (disposal cost plus environmental cost) is $100 per ton.
There are no general cost estimates of indirect costs associated with burial destruction.
However, we need to consider (Mukhtar et al., 2008) the adverse environmental impacts,
including air pollution due to odor emissions from burial sites; ground and surface water
pollution resulting from leaching of waste emissions from buried animal carcasses or plants
into underground water, or nearby surface stream pollution from disinfection, carcass flu-
ids, and slurry, etc.; contamination of soils; negative impacts on wildlife and fisheries;
potential lost tourism if the burial becomes widely publicized (a major factor in the U.K.
carcass burning), and movement restrictions on people and vehicles; the negative impacts
on the landscape and subsequent intended use of the burial site due to the potential change
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in allowed land use or vegetation (best practices and guidelines for contaminated plant and
animal disposal citation could result); indirect cost resulting from public opposition to the
use of mass burial sites, including legal fees, additional security cost along the transporta-
tion routes and surrounding areas if animal carcasses have to be disposed of off-site, and
potential security costs on site to keep animals from digging up buried carcasses. The latter
can be minimized if proper overlay is provided. Burial on private land can also impact fu-
ture land use and land values, especially if legislation requires that carcass burial be listed
on the property deed (again, a best practices and guidelines for contaminated plant and
animal disposal citation may result).
In general, the rank of environmentally preferred disposal methods from the most to
the least is rendering, incineration, composting, and burial.
3.4 Method for Analyzing Animal Carcass Disposal Costs
The goal of the optimal disposal model is to minimize total disposal costs including
disposal and transportation costs. These costs are subject to many constraints, including
types of different disposal facilities (fixed vs. mobile), the capacity of each facility, and
the availability of various disposal methods. Based on the simulated disease outbreaks,
the ”best” disposal technique(s) during the course of disease outbreak that minimize the
potential total disposal cost will be determined based on the contemporary and spatial dis-
tribution of daily carcass disposal load and the available capacities of disposal facilities in
the event area.
3.4.1 Model Assumption
i. Capacity Assumption
Because the capacity of the disposal location is unavailable, we assumed that each lo-
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cation has the capacity to process about 200 tons per day, or 400 mortalities per day.
ii. Mobile Facility Application
A mobile facility is only feasible for the incineration method. With environmental con-
cern and its disposal scale, we assume that this method is only used on the infected premises
with less than 10 cattle.
iii. Transportation Cost
Unit transportation cost is estimated as $1.00 per mile and 5 tons per truck per trip
(Catastrophic Animal Mortality Management Plan), and an out-of-study-area fixed dis-
posal plant is not considered an option.
iv. Burial Assumption
Although burial involves time effectiveness, it has the deepest impact on the environment.
The burial method will be applied only when other methods are unavailable or their ca-
pacities are exhausted, and disposal cost plus environmental cost is assumed as $100 per
ton.
v. Disposal Time Assumption
According to risk of infection and the number of cattle, the estimated disposal time is
shown in Table 12.
3.4.2 Mixed-Integer Programming Model
We divided the total carcass disposal cost into two components: costs of disposal
facilities and transportation costs of moving animal carcasses.
The minimization of animal carcass disposal costs faces constraints. Specifically, we
impose the following constraints:
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Table 12: Disposal Time by Herd Type
FARM TYPE Description Disposal time
1 feedlot1 Company owned feedlot (>50,000 head) 28
2 feedlot2 Stockholder feedlot (>20,000 but < 50,000) 28
3 feedlot3 Custom feedlot (>5,000 but < 20,000) 21
4 feedlot4 Backgrounder feedlot 14
5 feedlot5 Yearling-pasture feedlot 14
6 feedlot6 Dairy Calf-raiser feedlot 14
7 small beef <100 cattle 5
8 large beef > 100 cattle 10
9 small dairy <1000 number dairy cows 7
10 large dairy >1000 number dairy cows 5
11 backyard <10 cattle 1
12 small ruminant sheep and goats 3
13 swine pig concentrated animal feeding operations 10
(a) Carcass load balance constraints: The total carcasses transported from location s
cannot exceed the carcass load at location s.
(b) Disposal capacity constraints: The total carcasses transported to disposal location
k cannot exceed disposal capacity of location k.
Therefore, the cost minimization for animal carcass disposal can be written as∑
t
∑
f
∑
k
DCfkCDfkt +
∑
t
∑
s
∑
k
TCskTskt (3.1)
Subject to

∑
k Tskt ≤ LOADst
−∑s Tskt +∑f CDfkt ≤ 0 (3.2)
where f denotes the type of fixed disposal facility, k is the locations of disposal facilities, s
is the locations of carcasses, and t is time. The choice variables for the cost minimization of
animal carcass disposal consist of Tskt and CDfkt, with Tskt being the number of carcasses
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transported from site s to disposal site k during time t, and CDfkt being the number of
carcasses disposed of at disposal site k via method f during t.
3.5 Application
Data used in this chapter are from the Ausspread model described in Chapter II. We
selected four different scenarios-FMD disease introduced from large feedlots, small feed-
lots, large beef, and backyard. For each scenario, we selected the largest events simulated
from the Ausspread model.
3.5.1 Selection of Burial Locations
Figures 15- 18 are the distribution maps of carcass load and fixed disposal locations
under the scenario that an FMD disease is introduced into large feedlots, small feedlots,
large beef, and backyard, respectively.
Figure 15 is the carcass load under a scenario that an FMD disease is introduced
into large feedlots. In the figure, the red stars represent the fixed disposal locations of
incineration methods, the triangle is the composting method, the circle is rendering, and
the cylinders represent the number of cattle. Figure 15 shows that there are large numbers
of cattle (over 60,000) needing to be disposed of in regions 1,3,4, and 5, which means
the disposed carcasses per day are over 2,000, indicating that the burial method is needed.
Similarly, there are large numbers of carcasses needing to be disposed of in region 1 of
Fig. 16, region 2 of Fig. 17, and region 2 of Fig. 18. Those results from approximately 70%
of feedlots with over 10,000 cattle located in Deaf Smith, Parmer, and Castro Counties
(Fig. 19). Figure 19 not only shows the distribution of large feedlots but also shows the
distributions of roads and hydrology. The three ”best” mass burial locations are red circles
with low population density(Since population density is unavailable, we use road density
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to represent it.) and far from hydrologic circles. We treat the mass-burial method as fixed
disposal facilities, and the carcass transportation distance will be calculated as the distance
between the center of the burial locations and the carcass load locations.
3.5.2 Scenario 1
In scenario 1, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large feedlots. The largest
animal loss in the Ausspread model among 100 random runs is approximately 337,000.
By the mixed-integer program model, the total cost is estimated at about $33.3 million,
including disposal cost of $28.4 and transportation cost of $5 million (Table 13). Average
total cost under scenario 1 is about $98.9 per mortality, including disposal cost of $84.10
and transportation cost of $14.80 per mortality, implying that the average transportation
distance is approximately 29.6 miles.
Table 13: Estimated Costs under Different Scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Total(M) Unit Total(M) Unit Total(M) Unit Total(M) Unit
Disp. 28.4 84.1 28.6 84.3 26.7 83.4 12.8 68.2
Trans. 5 14.8 7.2 21.2 7.5 23.4 3.6 19.4
Total 33.3 98.9 35.8 105.5 34.2 106.8 16.4 87.6
Animal loss 337,149 339,529 320,278 187,312
Note: Disp. is the disposal cost.
Trans. is the transportation cost.
3.5.3 Scenario 2
In scenario 2, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in small feedlots. The
largest animal loss is approximately 339,000. The total cost is estimated at about $35.8
million, including disposal cost of $28.6 million and transportation cost of $7.2 million
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Figure 15: Carcass Load and Fixed Disposal Locations under Scenario 1
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Figure 16: Carcass Load and Fixed Disposal Locations under Scenario 2
61
Figure 17: Carcass Load and Fixed Disposal Locations under Scenario 3
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Figure 18: Carcass Load and Fixed Disposal Locations under Scenario 4
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Figure 19: Large Premises Distribution and Burial Locations
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(Table 13). Average total cost under scenario 2 is about $105.50 per mortality, including
disposal cost of $84.30 and transportation cost of $21.20 per mortality, implying an average
transportation distance of approximately 42.4 miles.
3.5.4 Scenario 3
In scenario 3, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large beef. The largest
animal loss is approximately 320,000. The total cost is estimated at about $33.3 million,
including disposal cost of $28.4 million and transportation cost $5.0 million (Table 13).
Average total cost under scenario 3 is about $98.90 per mortality, including disposal cost of
$83.40 and transportation cost of $23.40 per mortality, implying an average transportation
distance of approximately 46.8 miles.
3.5.5 Scenario 4
In scenario 4, we assume that an FMD virus is introduced in large feedlots. The largest
animal loss is approximately 187,000. By the mixed-integer program model, the total cost
is about $16.4 million, including disposal cost of $12.8 million and transportation cost of
$3.6 million (Table 13). Average total cost under scenario 4 is about $98.90 per mortality,
including disposal cost of $68.20 and transportation cost of $19.40 per mortality, implying
an average transportation distance of approximately 38.8 miles.
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we first tested the best mitigation strategies with average minimum an-
imal loss by the Tukey test, and the results showed the best mitigation strategies for all four
scenarios are strategies 1, 5, 9, 10, and 15. Then we used one of the best strategies, strategy
15, with the ”worst” or largest animal loss to estimate costs of disposing of animal car-
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casses and transportation under four different scenarios, and we examined the effectiveness
of the disposal strategies.
From the results in Table 13, the estimated average highest disposal cost is under
scenario 2, while the lowest is under scenario 4, because it had the largest-scale carcass
disposal. When the lower-cost disposal method is exhausted, higher-cost disposal meth-
ods will be needed. Thus, the unit disposal cost will vary with carcass scale. The unit
transportation cost also varies by the distributions of the infected premises and disposal lo-
cations. The estimated unit transportation cost is lower under scenarios 1 and 4 and higher
under scenarios 2 and 3 because under scenarios 2 and 3 the infected premises are more
highly concentrated, which causes less optimal options on transportation for the infected
premises.
Approximately 70% of feedlots with over 10,000 cattle are located in Deaf Smith,
Parmer, and Castro Counties. It is necessary to per-select burial locations or build new
fixed disposal locations to reduce transportation costs. In Fig. 9, we selected three burial
locations for mass carcass disposal, but this is relatively rough, and further selection of
burial locations can be done if more detailed GIS data are available.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FMD ON THE STOCK MARKET IN THE U.K.
4.1 Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease can have a devastating impact on food production and the
economy of rural areas in the infected country (Rich and Winter-Nelson, 2007). It can
spread rapidly, threaten animal welfare and health, and distort international trade. An FMD
outbreak typically removes animals from the market, closes export markets, and can re-
duce domestic demand for animal products. If trade restrictions take place, producers in
export-oriented countries can be affected especially badly. There can also be considerable
uncertainty and variation in outcomes.
During the 2001 U.K. outbreak, FMD was suspected at an abattoir in Essex on Febru-
ary 21 and confirmed the following day. On February 21, the European Union’s Standing
Veterinary Committee banned related United Kingdom exports. In mid-March, at the height
of the crisis, there were more than 40 confirmed cases per day. The epidemic lasted for 32
weeks, with the last case being confirmed on September 30, 2001. The Treasury of the
U.K. has estimated that the net economic effect of the outbreak was about 0.2% of gross
domestic product.
Index investing, including whole market or industry index investing, has gained tremen-
dous popularity in the past decade or so. There are many advantages of including an index
fund in one’s portfolio rather than holding only individual stocks. These advantages include
a reduction in trading costs and management fees, diversification of risk, postponement of
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taxable gains, and obtaining market predictability. Over an FMD period, investors are ex-
posed in a more risky environment and become more vulnerable, and thus it is essential
to understand how the market and industry indexes as well as individual firm stock prices
behave over time, especially following events such as an FMD outbreak. Investors and
policymakers should be concerned with whether or not a major event may lead to a sudden
change in return volatility and how unanticipated shocks will affect volatility over time.
FMD seems to have varying impacts on equity markets. To investigate the differences,
we studied returns at three different levels of the stock market: the whole-market level, the
individual-industry level, and the individual-firm level. Each level includes two different
markets, as follows.
1. The whole-market level is represented by FTSE 100 and FTSE 250
• The FTSE 100 is a major stock market in the U.K. The first 100 highly capi-
talized companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are listed on the FTSE
100 index, and FTSE 100 companies represent about 81% of the market cap-
italization of the whole London Stock Exchange. As of September 30, 2008,
the net market capitalization of the FTSE 100 Index was £1,171 billion. Thus,
it was selected to represent a highly capitalized market.
• The FTSE 250 is a capitalization-weighted index of 250 U.K. companies on the
London Stock Exchange. They are selected quarterly as being the 101st to 350th
largest companies with their primary listing on the exchange. As of September
30, 2008, the net market capitalization of the FTSE 250 Index was £161 billion
(or 13.7% of the FTSE 100 Index). It was selected to represent relatively small
capitalized market.
2. The food product and retail industry is represented by the food product index and the
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food and drug retail index.
• The food product index firms were selected from the FTSE 350, which is a
combination of the FTSE 100 Index of the largest 100 companies and the FTSE
250 Index of the next largest 250. It represents the entire food product industry.
• The food & drug retail index firms were selected from the FTSE 350 and rep-
resent the entire food product and food and drug retail industries.
3. The individual food product firm level is represented by Associated British Foods
(ABF) and Devro.
• Associated British Foods operates in most of the world’s main food markets. Its
business includes: grocery, sugar and agriculture, ingredients, and retail. Thus,
we selected it to represent non-meat-product firms.
• Devro, a public limited firm registered in Scotland, is one of the world’s lead-
ing producers of manufactured casings for the food industry, supplying a wide
range of products and technical support to manufacturers of sausages, salami,
hams, and other cooked meats. It was selected to represent meat-product firms.
Volatility is a widely used measure of market risk and is often referred to as the ”in-
vestor fear gauge”-a large amount of volatility is a result of investor fear or uncertainty,
while low values generally correspond to less stress. According to an asset-pricing model,
the current price of an asset is related to the expected volatility persistence. This implies
that correctly estimating volatility persistence in returns will help us build accurate asset
pricing models and will yield superior forecasts for return volatility. Financial market par-
ticipants are interested in knowing what events can alter the volatility pattern of financial
assets and how unanticipated shocks determine the persistence of volatility over time. An
event outbreak such as FMD could lead to more risk for investors. The purpose of this
paper is to measure the impact of the announcement of confirmed cases of FMD disease
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on market, industry, and firm-level volatility of return. It may help investors to understand
risk and build accurate asset pricing models, which can yield superior forecasts of return
volatility.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section II discusses methods used, including
summary statistics, univariate GARCH (1,1), and modified GARCH (1,1) in a mean model.
Section III contains the empirical results and robustness check by a rolling window model
and the final section presents a summary.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Summary Statistics
Let Pk,t be the stock k price at time t. Thus, we have
Rk,t = ln
Pk,t−1
Pk,t
= µk + εk,t (4.1)
where P is the stock index or price; Rk,t is the continuously compounded return of the kth
stock index over the period t - 1 to t; µk is the estimated mean of the kth stock price;
k = 1,...,6 represents six different stock indexes, including FTSE 100, FTSE 250, food
product, food and drug retail, Associated British Food, and Dervo; and
εk,t is the error term of the kth stock price at time t.
The unconditional mean (µk ) and unconditional variance (σ2k ) ofRk,t can be naturally
defined as
µk = E(Rk,t)
σ2k = E[(Rk,t − µ)2].
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Further, the daily volatility (DV) and annual volatility (AV) were defined as
DVk = sd(Rk,t) = σk
AVk = DVk ×
√
252=σk ×
√
252
Those first and second moments of continuously compounded returns will be used to
measure and compare both the return and risk of each series. Furthermore, a Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, a nonparametric test for mean difference, and an F-test will be em-
ployed to test mean and variance difference between the FMD and non-FMD periods.
Higher moments of the return often figure prominently in volatility models. The un-
conditional skewness and kurtosis are the third and fourth moment of the continuously
compounded return, defined as
Skewness =
E[(Rk,t−µ)3]
σ3
Kurtosis =
E[(Rk,t−µ)4]
σ4
Those will be used to measure and compare both the excess return and the risk of each
series between the FMD and non-FMD periods.
4.2.2 GARCH Analysis and Detecting Structure Break
The auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model (Engle, 1982) pro-
vides a means of describing the evolution of a conditional heteroskedasticity process as
a distributed lag of past squared residuals. It is a widely used class of models for the
conditional volatility and has been extended by Bollerslev (1986). Based on the work of
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Engle and Bollerslev (1986) and Bollerslev (1986), (Nelson, 1990) establishes necessary
and sufficient conditions for the stationarity and ergodicity of the GARCH (1,1) process.
A member of the ARCH class of models is the GARCH (p, q) model, with its process
characterized by the first two conditional moments:
Rt = µ+ εt
εt = ηt
√
ht
ht = ω +
r∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i +
s∑
j=1
βjht−j
(4.2)
where ω > 0, αi > 0, βi > 0 for all i, and ηt is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
with zero mean and variance 1.
A popular member of GARCH (p,q) is GARCH (1,1) (equation 4.3), which is the most
robust of the family of volatility models. Also, the GARCH (1,1), Eq. 4.3, can be rewritten
in terms of the unconditional variance as Eq. 4.4:
Rt = µ+ εt
εt = ηt
√
ht
ht = ω + αε
2
t−1 + βht−1
(4.3)
Rt = µ+ εt
εt = ηt
√
ht
ht = σ
2 + α(ε2t−1 − σ2) + β(ht−1 − σ2)
(4.4)
where σ2 = ω(1 − α − β)−1 is the unconditional variance. When α + β < 1, the
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conditional variance reverts to its mean value σ2 at a geometric rate of α+β. This structure
allows mean reversion at a reasonable rate only if α + β is very close to unity. The sum of
α and β in Eq. 4.3 also measures the persistence of volatility for a given shock, and a value
of one would entail an integrated GARCH (IGARCH) process, implying that shocks have
a permanent effect on the variance of a series.
The GARCH (1,1) model also can be used to compute 95% conditional predicted
intervals by the equation
95%CI=µ± 1.96×√ht
where µ is the predicted return over the FMD period because according to the mean
equation Rt = µ + εt the best predicted estimator for return is µ. The square root of
conditional variance(ht) is conditional volatility or standard deviation.
A commonly used time series analysis to test for the presence of a structural break is
the Chow test.
(Sc−(S1+S2))/k
(S1+S2)/(N1+N2−2k) ∼ Fk,N1+N2−2k
where Sc is the sum of squared residuals from the combined data, S1 is the sum of
squares from the first group, and S2 is the sum of squares from the second group. N1 and
N2 are the number of observations in each group, and k is the total number of parameters.
The test statistic is compared with an F-distribution having k and N1 +N2− 2k degrees of
freedom.
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4.2.3 Modified GARCH-in-Mean model
The volatility characteristics outlined are univariate, relating the volatility of the series
to only information contained in that series history. However, it is impossible that financial
asset prices evolve independently of the market around them (Engle and Andrew, 2001).
The standard GARCH (p,q)-M process suggested by Bollerslev (1986) for stock ex-
cess return, Rt, is given by
Rt = δ
√
ht + εt
ht = ω +
p∑
i
αiε
2
t−i +
q∑
i
βiht−i
(4.5)
where Et−1[εt] = 0 and Et−1ε2t = ht−1. The univariate GARCH-M model specifies
the conditional mean and variance function and assumes that the information set consists
only of the past innovations to the excess return, Rt. Hence, the only new information
that becomes available at date t - 1 is . If future variance is not a function only of the
squared innovation to current return, then a simple GARCH-M model is misspecified and
any empirical results based on it alone are not reliable (Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle,
1993).
Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) suggested a modeling technique to analyze volatility
in financial markets as follows:
74
Rt = X
′
tβ + δ
√
ht + εt
εt =
√
htηt
ht = ω +
p∑
i
αiε
2
t−i +
q∑
i
αiht−i
(4.6)
where X is a vector of regressors, and the sign and size of parameter δ capture the
direction and strength of the risk-return relationship. Parameter restrictions on the condi-
tional volatility equation are the same as for the GARCH model.
Glosten et al. (1993) developed a modified GARCH (p,q)-M model to input seasonal
indicator variables It into a conditional mean equation, and exogenous variables Xt−1 into
a conditional variance equation, as follows:
Rt = µ+ αIt + δ
√
ht + εt
εt =
√
htηt
ht = ω +
p∑
i=1
αiε
2
t−i +
q∑
j=1
βjht−j + γXt−1
(4.7)
This type of model could offer a structural or economic explanation for volatility.
In our case, we use the modified GARCH (1,1)-M to measure the different impacts of
FMD on whole economics, food product and retail industrial, and individual food product
firms. Model 1 can be written as
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MODEL 1
Rk,t = µk + λFMDTt + δ
√
hk,t + εk,t
εk,t =
√
htηt
hk,t = ωk + αkε
2
k,t−1 + βkhk,t−1 + γDcasek,t
(4.8)
where k = 1,...6 represent six different series, and FMDT is the indicator variables, which
are 1 if during the FMD outbreak period and otherwise 0. Dcase is the first difference
of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases. The difference represents
the shock of news or difference between investor expectation and the announcement if we
assume that the investor’s expectation is only based on the latest information. Intuitionally,
the return is taken as the first difference, which means that taking the difference for the
number of confirmed cases represents a co-movement with return.
Although our objective is to measure the impact of the number of confirmed cases on
volatility, some other variables may be helpful in explaining or improving the model esti-
mate. We could add indicator variables into the conditional variance equation, including
the September 11 events (S11), which is 1 if the date is 9/11/2001, and otherwise 0, and
the FMD period (FMDT), which is 1 if the date is between Feb. 20 and Sept. 30, 2001,
and otherwise 0. Therefore, in model 2 through model 4, we add different combinations of
these variables. These models are shown as
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MODEL 2
Rk,t = µk + λFMDTt + δ
√
hk,t + εk,t
εt =
√
hk,tηt
hk,t = ωk + αkε
2
k,t−1 + βkhk,t−1 + γDcasek,t + ψS11
(4.9)
In model 2, we add only S11 into the conditional variance equation.
MODEL 3
Rk,t = µk + λFMDTt + δ
√
ht + εk,t
εt =
√
htηt
hk,t = ωk + αkε
2
k,t−1 + βhk,t−1 + γDcasek,t + φFMDTt
(4.10)
In model 3, we add only FMDT into the conditional variance equation.
MODEL 4
Rk,t = µk + λFMDTt + δ
√
ht + εk,t
εt =
√
htηt
hk,t = ωk + αkε
2
k,t−1 + βkhk,t−1 + γDcasek,t + ψS11 + φFMDTt
(4.11)
In model 4, we add both S11 and FMDT into the conditional variance equation.
77
All models discussed in this section are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood
function for the model, assuming that εk,t is conditionally normally distributed. However,
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) pointed out that even if this assumption is incorrect, as
long as the conditional means and variances are correctly specified, the quasi-maximum
likelihood estimates will be consistent and asymptotically normal. The MLE estimate is
still appropriate if the conditional means and variances are correctly specified.
To determine the best-fitted specification, we use the likelihood ratio test, AICc , SIC,
and HQIC criteria. They are
AICc=k 2n
(n−k−1) -2log(likelihood),
SIC=kln(n)-2log(likelihood),
HQIC=2klnln(n)-2log(likelihood)
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4.3 Application and Results
4.3.1 Summary Statistic
We use daily close price data on the six series listed above, over the period April 6,
1999 to December 29, 2005, representing 1,738 observations. Figure 20 plots the index or
price for the six series. Over the FMD period, February 20 to September 30, 2001, the in-
dexes of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 decreased from 4003.42 to 3276.11, or about 18.1%,
and 4436.06 to 3490.79, or about 21.3%, respectively (Fig. 20). The food product and
food and drug retail industries’ indexes only decreased about 4.5% and 0.3%, respectively
(Fig. 20). For individual food product companies, Associated British Foods and Dervo,
their market prices decreased about 11.66% and 18.97%, respectively (Fig. 20).
We take the log-difference of the value of the series so as to convert the data into con-
tinuously compounded returns. The descriptive statistics for the return of those six series
in Table 14 are the (1) the mean; (2) the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, a non-parametric
test for mean difference; (3) the standard deviation; (4) the F-test for different variance; (5)
skewness; and (6) excess kurtosis.
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Figure 20: The Impact of the FMD on Stock Markets
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Table 14: Summary Statistics for Six Series
Mean Wilcoxon test Standard error F-TEST Skewness Kurtosis
. Non-FMD FMD Test Stat. p-value Non-FMD FMD F-Stat. p-value Non-FMD FMD Non-FMD FMD
FTSE100 -.00003 -.004 -1.13 0.25 0.0115 .0150 1.685 < .0001 -.148 -.404 5.35 4.27
FTSE250 .0002 -.003 2.29 .02 0.0084 .0101 1.457 .0006 -.395 -.926 4.845 6.170
Food product -.00028 -.0002 .817 .414 0.0124 .0127 1.037 .730 -.292 -.224 6.918 3.32
Food retail -.00036 -.002 .47 .63 0.0140 .0142 1.03 .768 .109 .171 5.55 5.60
ABF -.00049 -.0003 1.40 .16 0.0176 .0144 .663 .001 .383 .301 13.46 4.076
Devro -.00094 -.005 .205 .837 0.0196 .0226 1.327 .010 1.258 -.108 17.67 13.24
Obs 1603 135 1603 135 1603 135 1603 135
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In Table 14, column I provides the estimated unconditional mean for the six series over
the sample and FMD periods. All series have a very small positive average daily return ex-
cept for the Devro firm, and all series have smaller returns over the FMD period compared
with those over the sample period. The differences of the daily returns of the six series be-
tween the non-FMD and FMD periods are -0.3969%, -0.32% , 0.008%, -0.164%, 0.019%,
and -0.406%, respectively, indicating that there are large decreases over the FMD period
for the whole market (FTSE 100 and FTSE 250) and individual meat-product companies
(Devro).
The entries in column II are the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the difference of
mean of return over the FMD vs. non-FMD periods. For the FTSE 100, the P-value is
0.25, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two means are equal.
Similarly, for the six series, only for the FTSE 250, the means over the non-FMD period
are significantly greater than over the FMD period.
Column III provides the estimated unconditional volatility. Over the sample period,
the individual food companies have the highest volatility, then the food product and retail
industry, while the whole stock market index is the lowest, which may imply that the food
industry has relatively higher unconditional volatility regardless of the FMD event. The
difference of the annual unconditional volatilities of the six series between the FMD and
non-FMD periods are 5.55%, 2.69%, 0.47%, 0.317%, -5.08%, and 4.76%, respectively,
indicating that there are large increases over the FMD period on the whole market (FTSE
100 and FTSE 250) and meat-product firms (Devro), and slightly higher increases for the
food product and retail industry, although with a large decrease for non-meat-product firms.
Column IV is the F-test for the difference of variance of the return over the FMD vs.
the non-FMD period. For the FTSE 100, the P-value is less than 0.0001, suggesting that
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we can reject the null hypothesis that the two variances are equal; further, it suggests that
unconditional volatility over the FMD period is significantly greater than over the non-
FMD period. Similarly, the unconditional volatility of the FTSE 250 and meat-product
firms over the FMD period are significantly greatly than over the non-FMD period, while
an F-statistic of 0.663 and a P-value of 0.001 for non-meat-product companies indicate
that the unconditional volatility of non-meat-product firms is significant lower over the
non-FMD period than over the FMD period.
In general, Table 14 indicates that FMD did have an impact on both the unconditional
mean and volatility of the six series-more or less. The largest effect seems to be a negative
impact on unconditional mean for the small capitalization market (FTSE 250), while for
others its impact is relatively smaller, and insignificant. It also has a larger positive and
statistically significant impact on unconditional volatility for the whole market and meat-
product firms.
The negative skewness coefficients of the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250, and food product
indexes provided in column IV indicate that the return distribution is substantially nega-
tively skewed (mean less than median), implying more excess negative return than excess
positive return, while the others have slightly positive skewness, indicating more extreme
positive return (Fig. 21). Compared with the estimated skewness coefficients over the non-
FMD period, the estimated skewness coefficients over the FMD period are ”more nega-
tively” skewed for the whole market and for individual food product companies, indicating
more excess negative return over the FMD period, while they are ”more positively” skewed
for the food product and retail industry.
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Figure 21: Box-plot for Six Series
The kurtosis coefficient is a measure of the thickness of the tails of the distribution.
Compared with the estimated kurtosis coefficients over the non-FMD period, the estimated
kurtosis coefficients over the FMD period are ”more thin” for FTSE 100, the food product
industry, and individual food product companies, indicating less excess return over the
FMD period, while more for FTSE 250 and the food retail industry. Additionally, all have
heavy tails and skewness (Fig. 21), implying excess return and risk. Those suggest that a
GARCH-M model is needed to capture both the skewness and the high kurtosis.
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In general, although the volatility of FTSE 100 and meat products is higher over the
FMD period, their excess return is less, implying market price fluctuation is relative large
but within a limited range. Both volatility and excess return for non-meat-product firms
are less over the FMD period, implying that non-meat-product firms are less affected, even
”better off” to some extent, which may result from the food substitution effect.
4.3.2 GARCH Analysis and Structure Break
An analysis of the correlation of the returns, presented in Fig. 22, indicates only weak
dependence in the FTSE 250, the individual firm’s return. The correlation of the squared
returns ( Fig. 23), however, indicates substantial dependence in the volatility of returns and
implies a GARCH analysis. As discussed above, the GARCH (1,1) is a popular, and the
most robust, member of the family of volatility models. Thus, we first will fit those six
series into the GARCH (1,1).
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Figure 22: ACF and PACF Test for Daily Return
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Figure 23: ACF and PACF Test for Squared Return
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The parameter estimates for those six series are presented in Table 15. The P-values of
LM test statistics for all series are larger than 10%, suggesting that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no ARCH errors and the goodness of fit of the models. The unconditional
variance of the GARCH (1,1) process is calculated as σ2 = ω(1− α− β)−1. For example,
using the estimated parameters ω, α and β, the estimated unconditional volatility of the
FTSE 100 over the sample period is 0.0113, which is very close to the 0.0115 of the sample
unconditional volatility (Table 1). Similarly, the others also are very close to the sample
unconditional volatility (Rows VII and VIII), indicating that the GARCH (1,1) model is
fitted well. Table 14 also provides estimated conditional volatility over the sample and the
FMD period. The conditional volatility over the FMD period is much higher than that the
over the period for the large-capitalization stock market (FTSE 100) and meat-product firm
(Devro). For the small-capitalization stock market (FTSE 250), the estimated conditional
volatility over the FMD period is 0.00835, slightly higher than that over the sample period,
0.00807.
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Table 15: Parameter Estimate for Six Series
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Food Product Food Retail ABF Devro
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 4.11E-04 0.058 7.57E-04 < .0001 4.48E-04 0.0798 0.05962 5.96E-02 0.0006 0.030 3.31E-04 0.393
ω 1.95E-06 0.005 4.50E-06 < .0001 1.31E-06 0.0116 5.10E-06 0.0040 4.00E-07 0.0252 6.41E-06 < .0001
α 0.08622 < .0001 0.1078 < .0001 0.04749 < .0001 0.072 < .0001 0.031 < .0001 0.054 < .0001
β 0.8986 < .0001 0.8283 < .0001 0.9447 < .0001 0.9009 < .0001 0.967 < .0001 0.931 < .0001
LM TEST 12.86 0.379 17.10 0.145 2.99 0.995 16.455 0.171 8.227 0.767 14.403 0.275
UˆV
∗
0.0113 0.00839 0.0129 0.0138 0.0147 0.0210
Sample UV 0.0115 0.0084 0.0124 0.014 0.0176 0.0196
ˆCV ∗(Sample) 0.0108 0.00807 0.0120 0.0135 0.0160 0.0187
CˆV (FMD) 0.0130 0.00835 0.0118 0.0134 0.0151 0.0218
Note:
UˆV is the estimated Unconditional Volatility from summary statistics
CˆV is the estimated conditional Volatility from GARCH(1,1) model
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The conditional volatility over the FMD period is slightly lower than that over the
sample period for food products, the food and drug retail industry, as well as Associated
British Foods, a non-meat-product firm.
Figure 24 plots the estimated conditional volatility of the GARCH (1,1) model for
six markets. It also shows that the FMD event had different effects on those markets. For
whole market and meat-product firms, its effect is relatively larger than average conditional
volatility (red dashed lines), implying that the market and investors indeed ”fear,” while for
the food products and retail industry, as well as the non-meat-product companies, its impact
is relatively smaller, and investors feel less stressful.
Figure 25 plots real return and 95% conditional predicted intervals over the FMD
period, which are computed by equation 95%CI = µ ± 1.96 × √ht. It shows that there
are few real return jumps outside predicted intervals-for example, in FTSE 100, FTSE 250,
and the Devro firm-and thus there is the possibility of structure change.
93
Figure 24: Estimate Conditional Volatility for Six Series
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Figure 25: Real Return and 95% Conditional Predicted Intervals over FMD Period
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Table 16: Chow Test for Structure Change
Break points 23 March 2001 11 Sept. 2001
F-stat. P-value F-stat. P-value
FTSE100 1.27 0.2592 1.92 0.1660
FTSE250 0.92 0.3388 2.10 0.1473
Food product 0.89 0.3458 0.46 0.4965
Food retail 0.01 0.9394 0.00 0.9465
ABF 0.05 0.8269 0.26 0.6133
Devro 8.48 0.0036 5.19 0.0229
A Chow test was provided in Table 16 to test structure change at the break point on
March 23, 2001, when the number of confirmed cases jumped up to 40 and last three days
and 11 Sept. 2001, 9-11 event. We also tested before and after 10 days of the specific day
(March 23, 2001), but the value of the F-statistic is the largest on that day. Thus, we chose
it as the structure break point.
In Table 16, there is a structure break only on meat-product firms. Although the Chow
test is also statistically significant at the 9-11 point, the significance may be caused by
FMD events. We also tested before and after 10 days of the specific day (9/11/2001), but
the value of the F-Statistic is not the largest on the 9/11 event point.
4.3.3 GARCH-M Estimate
Our objective is to measure the different impacts of the FMD event on the volatility of
different markets. As discussed above, GARCH (1,1) is fitted well, and other information
sets include the number of confirmed cases, the time period of the FMD outbreak, and the
9/11 event. Those suggest that we can use a variety of modified GARCH (1,1)-in-mean
models.
Table 17 presents the estimates for Model 1 through Model 4 for the FTSE 100 index.
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Comparing Model 2 with Model 1, the value of the LRT test statistic is 17.48. Under the
null hypothesis that Model 1 is correctly specified, this test statistic should be asymptoti-
cally distributed as an χ21 random variable. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis at the
10% level. A smaller AIC value for Model 2 also suggests that Model 2 should be better
fitted. Similarly, Model 3 and Model 4 are better fitted compared with Model 1 by both the
LRT test and the AIC criterion. For comparison of Model 2 and Model 3, the only criterion
used is AIC, which shows that Model 2 with smaller AIC (-10974.44) is better. The result
for comparison of Model 2 and Model 4 is a little confusing. The LRT test statistic is 2.45,
referring to χ21, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that Model 4 is significantly bet-
ter than Model 2 at the 5% level. However, the AIC from Model 4 is -10974.90, slightly
smaller than that from Model 2, with -10974.44 of AIC. Finally, we use Model 2 to fit the
FTSE 100 series because it had a better estimate on the mean equation. Similarly, the other
series were estimated, and the results are provided in Tables 18- 22. We apply Model 2 to
FTSE 250, food products, the food and drug retail index, and the Associated British Foods
firm series, and Model 3 to the Devro firm series.
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Table 17: Exogenous Variables Selection for FEST 100
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.00033 0.67 0.00042 0.59 0.00038 0.63 0.0004 0.58
FMDT -0.0018 0.023 -0.0021 0.010 -0.00175 0.11 -0.0019 0.052
ω 1.6E-06 0.002 1.6E-06 0.0017 1.7E-06 0.0015 1.7E-06 0.001
α 0.081 < .0001 0.078 < .0001 0.0767 < .0001 0.0732 < .0001
β 0.905 < .0001 0.912 < .0001 0.9068 < .0001 0.909 < .0001
δ 0.0195 0.81 0.0093 0.91 0.0141 0.87 0.0081 0.92
Dcase 4.0E-06 0.0275 4.40E-06 0.0072 6.4E-06 0.013 5.5E-06 0.013
S11 0.00058 0.21 0.00058 0.24
FMDT 4.2E-06 0.011 2.2E-06 0.211
Log likelihood 5486.48 5495.22 5490.04 5496.45
AICc -10958.96 -10974.44 -10964.09 -10974.90
SIC -10920.73 -10930.75 -10920.39 -10925.75
HQIC -10944.82 -10958.28 -10947.92 -10956.72
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
Table 18: Exogenous Variables Selection for FEST 250
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.0011 0.268 0.0012 0.233 0.00118 0.25 0.0013 0.21
FMDT -0.0013 0.051 -0.0013 0.041 -0.0013 0.091 -0.0013 0.074
ω 3.82E-06 0.0001 3.1E-06 0.0002 3.4E-06 0.0002 3.0E-06 0.0003
α 0.098 < .0001 0.076 < .0001 0.094 < .0001 0.075 < .0001
β 0.847 < .0001 0.87 < .0001 0.855 < .0001 0.878 < .0001
δ -0.037 0.77 -0.059 0.66 -0.041 0.75 -0.0639 0.64
Dcase 7.8E-07 0.18 1.1E-06 0.031 1.1E-06 0.12 1.3E-06 0.032
Sept11 0.000572 0.19 5.5E-04 0.20
FMDT 9.8E-07 0.35 5.6E-07 0.503
Log likelihood 5917.43 5921.75 5917.85 5921.96
AICc -11820.86 -11827.52 -11819.7 -11825.93
SIC -11782.63 -11783.81 -11776.01 -11776.77
HQIC -11806.72 -11811.34 -11803.54 -11807.74
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 19: Exogenous Variables Selection for Food Product Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.0013 0.19 0.0012 0.23 0.0013 0.19 1.3E-03 0.16
FMDT -0.000074 0.93 -0.0013 0.04 -0.000072 0.94 -1.5E-04 0.88
ω 1.3E-06 0.0004 3.1E-06 0.0002 1.2E-06 0.0004 1.2E-06 0.0004
α 0.0487 < .0001 0.076 < .0001 0.048 < .0001 0.045 < .0001
β 0.943 < .0001 0.875 < .0001 0.944 < .0001 .943 < .0001
δ -0.081 0.37 -0.059 0.66 -0.080 0.37 -8.8E-02 0.33
Dcase 8.0E-23 1 1.1E-06 0.031 4.0E-24 1 3.7E-07 0.88
Sept11 0.00057 0.19 0.00032 0.16
FMDT 3.8E-07 0.60 3.6E-23 1
Log likelihood 5264.93 5273.21 5265.04 5273.21
AICc -10517.86 -10530.43 -10516.08 -10530.43
SIC -10477.63 -10486.73 -10470.39 -10479.27
HQIC -10501.72 -10514.26 -10497.92 -10510.24
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
Table 20: Exogenous Variables Selection for Food & Drug Retail Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.00069 0.61 0.00078 0.56 0.00069 0.61 0.00078 0.56
FMDT -0.00022 0.82 -5.5E-04 0.59 -2.7E-04 0.80 -5.5E-04 0.59
ω 5.35E-06 < .0001 4.94E-06 < .0001 5.1E-06 < .0001 4.9E-06 < .0001
α 0.076 < .0001 0.070 < .0001 0.075 < .0001 0.070 < .0001
β 0.89 < .0001 0.903 < .0001 0.898 < .0001 0.903 < .0001
δ -0.010 0.92 -1.7E-02 0.87 -9.5E-03 0.92 -1.7E-02 0.87
Dcase -1.2E-22 1 8.6E-07 0.79 -4.5E-23 1 8.6E-07 0.79
Sept11 0.00063 0.11 0.00063 0.11
FMDT 1.7E-06 0.27 -3.5E-23 1
Log likelihood 5051.22 5059.39 5051.65 5059.39
AICc -10088.37 -10102.69 -10087.21 -10100.67
SIC -10050.21 -10059.09 -10043.61 -10051.63
HQIC -10074.30 -10086.62 -10071.14 -10082.60
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 21: Exogenous Variables Selection for Associated British Foods
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.0011 0.082 0.00113 0.07 0.0011 0.07 0.0011 0.07
FMDT -0.00079 0.47 -6.1E-04 0.61 -7.4E-04 0.55 -6.1E-04 0.62
ω 4.0E-07 0.003 4.0E-07 0.002 4.2E-07 0.002 3.9E-07 0.002
α 0.034 < .0001 0.033 < .0001 0.034 < .0001 0.033 < .0001
β 0.964 < .0001 0.964 < .0001 0.963 < .0001 0.964 < .0001
δ -0.039 0.45 -4.0E-02 0.44 -3.9E-02 0.45 -4.1E-02 0.43
Dcase 5.3E-06 0.045 6.8E-06 0.0087 8.8E-06 0.030 6.8E-06 0.07
Sept11 0.00027 0.02 0.00027 0.03
FMDT 1.5E-06 0.080 -6.2E-24 1
Log likelihood 4869.84 4876.96 4870.98 4876.96
AICc -9725.69 -9737.92 -9725.97 -9737.92
SIC -9687.45 -9694.23 -9682.27 -9686.77
HQIC -9711.54 -9721.76 -9709.80 -9717.74
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
Table 22: Exogenous Variables Selection for Devro
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.00094 0.42 0.00095 0.42 -0.000739 0.52 -0.0010 0.37
FMDT 0.0019 0.01 2.1E-03 0.003 7.3E-04 0.78 1.0E-03 0.68
ω 6.2E-06 < .0001 6.6E-06 < .0001 0.000031 < .0001 0.000030 < .0001
α 0.055 < .0001 0.057 < .0001 0.149 < .0001 0.145 < .0001
β 0.931 < .0001 0.928 < .0001 0.772 < .0001 0.775 < .0001
δ -0.011 0.86 -1.3E-02 0.85 7.5E-02 0.26 9.5E-02 0.16
Dcase 3.2E-06 0.018 3.3E-06 0.016 0.000036 < .0001 3.6E-05 < .0001
Sept11 0.000238 0.30 0.000099 0.89
FMDT 0.000083 < .0001 0.0000803 < .0001
Log likelihood 4524.57 4524.90 4549.37 4547.19
AIC -9035.15 -9033.81 -9082.74 -9076.38
SIC -8996.91 -8990.11 -9039.05 -9027.23
HQIC -9021.00 -9017.64 -9066.58 -9058.20
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
102
Table 23: Parameter Estimate for Six Series
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 Food product Food retail ABF Devro
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Constant 0.00042 0.597 0.0012 0.233 0.0013 0.162 0.00078 0.562 0.0011 0.074 -0.000739 0.5259
FMDT -0.0021 0.010 -0.0013 0.0417 -0.000152 0.88 -0.00055 0.5987 -0.000614 0.6112 7.38E-04 0.781
ω 1.6E-06 0.0017 3.1E-06 0.0002 1.2E-06 0.0004 4.9E-06 < .0001 4.0E-07 0.0026 0.0000311 < .0001
α 0.0728 < .0001 0.0764 < .0001 0.0456 < .0001 0.0702 < .0001 0.0338 < .0001 0.1494 < .0001
β 0.912 < .0001 0.875 < .0001 0.946 < .0001 0.903 < .0001 0.964 < .0001 0.7723 < .0001
δ 0.009361 0.913 -0.0599 0.668 -0.0881 0.33 -0.017 0.87 -0.04 0.44 7.55E-02 0.2664
Dcase 4.4E-06 0.0072 1.1E-06 0.0317 3.75E-07 0.87 8.6E-07 0.7954 6.89E-06 0.0087 3.6E-05 < .0001
Sept11 0.000589 0.2127 0.000572 0.195 0.000321 0.1623 0.000639 0.1157 0.000276 0.0294 - -
FMDT - - - - - - - - - - 8.36E-05 < .0001
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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The models with best-fitted estimate for each series are summarized in Table 23. For
the FTSE 100, the best-fitted model is estimated in Eq. 4.13. The estimated coefficient
over the FMD period (FMDTt) in the mean equation is 0.0021, lower than that over the
non-FMD period, and it is statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of
√
ht is
0.00936, indicating a positive relationship between return and risk (volatility) but not sta-
tistical significance. The estimated coefficient of ARCH terms (h2t−1 ) is 0.0728, slightly
lower than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1) model, 0.0862, and it is statistically signif-
icant by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with equal variance, while for the GARCH terms
(ε2t−1 ) is 0.912, slightly higher than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1) model, 0.8986.
The estimated α + β in both the GARCH (1,1) and GARCH (1,1)-M models is not signif-
icantly different from unity by one side Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, which implies that
the integrated GARCH (volatility persistence) and volatility structure are unchanged. The
estimated coefficient of the difference of the number of daily cases (Dcase) is 0.0000044,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the average marginal impact
on daily volatility is 0.0021( =
√
.0000044=.21%), or about 3.3% annual volatility. This
indicates that when increase 1 the first difference of confirmed case, which will increase
3.3% annual volatility on average.
Rt = .00042− 0.0021FMDT ∗∗t + .00936
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000016 + 0.0728ε
2∗∗∗
t−1 + 0.912h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .0000044Dcase
∗∗
t + .000589S11t
(4.12)
For the FTSE 250, the best-fitted model is estimated in Eq. 4.13. The estimated co-
efficient of over the FMD period (FMDTt) is -0.0013, and it is statistically significant,
indicating that it is 0.0013 lower than that over the other period on daily return. The esti-
mated coefficient of
√
ht ,-0.0599 indicates a negative relationship between return and risk
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but not statistical significance. The estimated coefficient of ARCH terms (ε2t−1) is 0.0764,
slightly lower than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1) model, 0.1078, and it is statistically
significant, while the GARCH term (h2t−1 ) is 0.875, slightly higher than that estimated in
the GARCH(1,1) model, 0.8283,. The estimated coefficient of the difference of the number
of daily cases (Dcase) is 0.000001, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. The
average marginal impact on daily volatility is 0.001(0.1%), about 1.58% annual volatility,
indicating that when increase 1 the first difference of confirmed case, which will increase
1.58% annual volatility at average.
Rt = .0012− 0.0013FMDT ∗t +−.0599
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000031
∗∗∗ + 0.0764ε2∗∗∗t−1 + 0.875h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .000001Dcase
∗
t + .000572S11t
(4.13)
Similarly, for both the food-product (Eq. 4.14) and food retail indexes (Eq. 4.15), the
estimated coefficients from the GARCH (1,1)-M model of Dcase show a positive impact
on volatility but not a significant one, and FMDTt is negative but not statistically signif-
icant. The estimated coefficients of α , β and α + β are not significantly different for the
two models, implying no significant impact of FMD on the whole food product and retail
industry.
Rt = 0.0013− 0.000152FMDTt +−.0811
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000012
∗∗∗ + 0.0456ε2∗∗∗t−1 + 0.946h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .00000037Dcaset + .000321S11t
(4.14)
Rt = 0.00078− 0.00055FMDTt +−0.017
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000049
∗∗∗ + 0.0702ε2∗∗∗t−1 + 0.9036h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .00000086Dcaset + 0.000639S11t
(4.15)
For non-meat product firms (ABF), the best-fitted model is estimated in Eq. 4.16. The
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estimated coefficient over the FMD period (FMDTt) is -0.000614 in the mean equation,
but it is not statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of
√
ht, -0.04, indicates a
negative relationship between return and risk but not a statistically significant one. The
estimated coefficient of the ARCH terms is 0.0338, slightly higher than that estimated in
the GARCH (1,1) model, 0.031, and it is statistically significant, while the GARCH term
is 0.964, slightly lower than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1) model, 0.967. Estimated
α+ β in both the GARCH (1,1) and GARCH (1,1)-M models is not significantly different
from unity, indicating integrated GARCH (volatility persistence) and volatility structure
unchanged. The estimated coefficient of the difference of the number of daily cases (Dcase)
is 0.00000689, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The average marginal
impact on daily volatility is 0.0026 (0.25%) , or about 4.17% annual volatility.
Rt = 0.0011− 0.000614FMDTt − .04
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000004
∗∗∗ + 0.0338ε2∗∗∗t−1 + 0.964h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .00000689Dcase
∗∗
t + 0.000276S11
∗
t
(4.16)
For Devro, a meat-product firm, the best-fitted model is estimated in Eq. 4.17.From
this model, daily return over the FMD period (FMDTt) is 0.000738, but it is not statisti-
cally significant. The estimated coefficient of
√
ht is .00936, indicating a positive relation-
ship between return and risk (volatility), but it is not statistically significant. The estimated
coefficient of ARCH terms is 0.149, much higher than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1)
model, 0.054, and the difference is statistically significant, while the estimated coefficient
of GARCH terms is 0.772, much lower than that estimated in the GARCH (1,1) model,
0.931. The estimated α + β in both GARCH (1,1) and GARCH is not significantly dif-
ferent from unity, which implies an integrated GARCH (volatility persistence), but in the
GARCH (1,1)-M model α + β is significantly different from unity, implying a volatility
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structure change after the introduction of exogenous variables. The estimated coefficient of
the difference of the number of daily cases (Dcase) is 0.000036, which is statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.1% level. The average marginal impact on daily volatility is 0.006 (0.6%),
about 9.5% annual volatility, indicating that when increase 1 confirmed case, which will
increase 9.5% annual volatility at average and over the FMD period, the conditional volatil-
ity is statistically significantly 14.51% higher than that over the non-FMD period at annual
volatility.
Rt = −0.000739 + 0.000738FMDTt − .0755
√
ht + εt
ht = .0000311
∗∗∗ + 0.149ε2∗∗∗t−1 + 0.772h
∗∗∗
t−1 + .000036Dcase
∗∗∗
t + 0.0000836FMDT
∗∗∗
t
(4.17)
4.3.4 Robustness
We assess the model’s stability by a rolling analysis. We used a different rolling
window with the same length-for example, rolling forward 100, 200, 300, and 400 ob-
servations, then comparing the estimated coefficients with those from the original sample.
Tables 24 through 29 provide the comparison between the original sample and rolling for-
ward 100 to 400 observations for the six series. From Table 24, the coefficient of FMDT is
relatively stable, with a range from -0.0021 to -0.0024, implying that the returns over the
FMD period are indeed lower than those over the non-FMD period, regardless of the sam-
ple selection for the FTSE 100. The estimated coefficient of first difference of the number
of confirmed cases, also relatively stable, ranged from 3.81×10−6 to 4.4×10−6 , implying
that the Dcase indeed impact the conditional volatility, while the estimated coefficients of
ARCH and GARCH are very stable. This indicates the stability of the volatility construct.
Also, for other series, the estimated constructs are very stable.
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Similarly, for FTSE 250, the returns over the FMD period are lower than over the
non-FMD period, regardless of the sample section, but the impact of first difference of the
confirmed case on conditional volatility does vary with sample selection at a significant
level. Hence, it is not certain if it has impact on conditional volatility. Tables 28 and 29
show that the Dcase does impact the conditional volatility for both non-meat-product firms
(ABF) and meat-product firms (Devro). For meat products, the conditional volatility over
the FMD period is higher than over the non-FMD period.
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Table 24: Robustness Check for FTSE 100
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) 4.2 0.59 5.5 0.49 5.44 0.48 7.76 0.29 6.54 0.37
FMDT (10−3) -2.1 0.01 -2.16 0.0087 -2.2 0.0072 -2.33 0.0037 -2.43 0.0023
ω(10−6) 1.6 0.0017 1.82 0.0008 1.88 0.0006 2.00 0.0001 2.01 0.0001
α 0.072 < .0001 0.073 < .0001 0.08 < .0001 0.084 < .0001 0.086 < .0001
β 0.91 < .0001 0.91 < .0001 0.90 < .0001 0.89 < .0001 0.89 < .0001
δ(10−3) 9.36 0.91 3.5 0.96 6.94 0.93 -3.218 0.96 17.7 0.83
Dcase (10−6) 4.40 0.0072 4.33 0.008 4.19 0.014 3.94 0.02 3.81 0.03
Sept11 (10−4) 5.89 0.21 6.08 0.22 6.42 0.25 6.88 0.28 7.02 0.29
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 25: Robustness Check for FTSE 250
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) .12 0.23 1.61 0.18 1.18 0.24 1.39 0.16 1.25 0.22
FMDT (10−3) -1.3 0.04 -1.39 0.06 -1.46 0.04 -1.61 0.02 -1.16 0.03
ω(10−6) 3.10 0.0002 4.91 0.0001 4.21 < .0001 5.07 < .0001 5.16 < .0001
α 0.076 < .0001 0.089 < .0001 0.092 < .0001 0.10 < .0001 0.095 < .0001
β 0.87 < .0001 0.84 < .0001 0.85 < .0001 0.82 < .0001 0.83 < .0001
δ(10−3) -59.9 0.66 -91.7 0.544 -30.6 0.80 -35.1 0.77 -15.9 0.89
Dcase (10−6) 1.10 0.031 .95 0.10 .95 0.10 .703 0.26 .825 0.18
Sept11 (10−4) 5.72 0.19 7.17 0.21 6.05 0.24 7.06 0.25 6.93 0.24
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 26: Robustness Check for Food Product
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) 1.3 0.16 1.28 0.17 1.17 0.21 1.674 0.10 1.41 0.16
FMDT (10−3) -1.52 0.88 -1.35 0.89 -1.84 0.85 -1.87 0.84 -3.33 0.72
ω(10−6) 1.20 0.0004 1.08 0.0006 1.44 0.0001 1.36 0.0001 1.60 < .0001
α 0.04 < .0001 0.043 < .0001 0.054 < .0001 0.045 < .0001 0.05 < .0001
β 0.87 < .0001 0.84 < .0001 0.85 < .0001 0.82 < .0001 0.83 < .0001
δ(10−3) -88.1 0.33 -81.3 0.35 -62.7 0.49 -112.0 0.28 -72.4 0.49
Dcase (10−6) .37 0.87 .38 0.86 .09 0.96 .191 0.93 .48 0.98
Sept11 (10−4) 3.21 0.16 3.0 0.1458 3.79 0.21 3.53 0.16 3.96 0.20
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 27: Robustness Check for Food Retail
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) 7.8 0.56 10.2 0.43 12.94 0.31 20.2 0.13 23.43 0.07
FMDT (10−3) -0.55 0.59 -5.77 0.57 -6.81 0.50 -7.46 0.45 -7.21 0.45
ω(10−6) 4.90 0.0001 4.04 < .0001 4.17 < .0001 5.37 < .0001 5.01 < .0001
α 0.07 < .0001 0.06 < .0001 0.06 < .0001 0.07 < .0001 0.06 < .0001
β 0.90 < .0001 0.91 < .0001 0.90 < .0001 0.89 < .0001 0.89 < .0001
δ(10−3) -17.0 0.87 -34.6 0.74 -48.5 0.64 -100. 0.36 -132.9 0.24
Dcase (10−6) 86.0 0.79 1.01 0.74 91.7 0.76 59.1 0.84 61.6 0.83
Sept11 (10−4) 6.39 0.11 5.94 0.091 6.13 0.09 7.1 0.12 7.0 0.11
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 28: Robustness Check for ABF
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) 11 0.074 5.79 0.45 2.94 0.70 5.74 0.53 -0.44 0.96
FMDT (10−3) -0.61 0.61 -65.3 0.59 -1.01 0.36 -0.55 0.65 -1.147 0.27
ω(10−6) 40.0 0.0026 66.1 < .0001 1.64 < .0001 61.8 < .0001 3.12 < .0001
α 0.03 < .0001 0.02 < .0001 0.05 < .0001 0.02 < .0001 0.06 < .0001
β 0.96 < .0001 0.97 < .0001 0.93 < .0001 0.97 < .0001 0.91 < .0001
δ(10−3) -40 0.44 3.79 0.95 39.5 0.57 -2.358 0.97 71.4 0.43
Dcase (10−6) 6.89 0.008 6.83 0.007 6.18 0.03 6.29 0.008 5.27 0.07
Sept11 (10−4) 2.76 0.02 2.7 0.02 3.0 0.08 2.80 0.01 4.13 0.13
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship.
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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Table 29: Robustness Check for Devro
Original Sample Rolling 100 Rolling 200 Rolling 300 Rolling 400
Model Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
Cons.(10−4) -7.39 0.52 -2.26 0.85 -31.96 0.0093 .846 0.84 1.86 0.92
FMDT(10−3) .738 0.78 0.22 0.92 -3.55 0.16 -0.08 0.96 -0.195 0.94
ω(10−6) 31.1 < .0001 36.5 < .0001 52.7 < .0001 41.3 < .0001 43.6 < .0001
α 0.14 < .0001 0.15 < .0001 0.21 < .0001 0.13 < .0001 0.15 < .0001
β 0.77 < .0001 0.75 < .0001 0.65 < .0001 0.74 . 0.71 < .0001
δ(10−3) 75.5 0.2664 48.2 0.5118 23.09 0.0012 36.2 . 15.9 0.894
Dcase (10−6) 36.0 < .0001 35.3 < .0001 34.5 0.0014 35.3 < .0001 36.0 < .0001
FMDT(10−5) 8.36 < .0001 8.38 < .0001 11.4 < .0001 9.07 . 9.95 < .0001
Obs. 1738 1738 1738 1738 1738
Note: FMDT is the indicator variables, which are 1 if during the FMD outbreak and otherwise 0.
δ is the direction and strength of the risk-return relationship
Dcase is the first difference of scheduled announcement of the number of confirmed cases.
Sept11 is the indicator variables, which is 1 if time is September 11, 2001 and otherwise 0.
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4.4 Summary
From summary statistics Table 14, we found that the unconditional mean of daily re-
turn had a larger decrease for whole markets represented by the FTSE 100 and the FTSE
250 and individual food-product companies, represented by Associated British Foods and
Devro, compared with the sample period from Apr. 1999 to Dec. 2005. The uncondi-
tional volatility had a larger increase for whole markets and individual food product firms
associated with meat products, while for the whole food product and retail industry, the
unconditional volatility is unchanged, even decreased for non-meat-product firms.
From the GARCH (1,1)-M model and rolling window model, we found that the mean
of return over the FMD period is significantly lower than that over the non-FMD period
for the whole stock market represented by the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250, but not sig-
nificantly different for the food product and retail industry and food-product companies.
We also found that the conditional volatilities over the FMD period are much higher than
those over the sample period for the large-capitalization stock market (FTSE 100) and De-
vro, which is associated with meat products. For the small-capitalization stock market, the
estimated conditional volatility over the FMD period is slightly higher, while it is slightly
lower for food products, the food and drug retail industry, as well as Associated British
Foods (non-meat products). The announcement of the confirmed cases had an impact on
the large-capitalization market and the food-product firm, and it had the largest marginal
impact on meat products. With an estimated coefficient of 0.000036, it indicated when
increase 1 confirmed case, the annual volatility will increase at 9.5%, while for non-meat
product and large capitalization market; they are estimated as 4.1% and 3.3%, respectively,
given the original sample.
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Another finding is that the FMD does not have significant impact on the whole food
product and retail industry but does have an impact on whole markets, the reason being
that on the one hand, although meat-product companies are hit badly, for non-meat-product
firms (e.g., Associated British Foods) the impact is small and not significant-even uncon-
ditional and conditional volatility are lower over the FMD period. On the other hand, the
FMD hit badly not only the meat-product companies but also insurance and tourism com-
panies, and the whole market index includes those firms.
Our results have important implications for index investing and option pricing. The
index investing approach is generally considered a passive strategy. However, our results
suggest that major events may lead to volatility shifts and may alter the risk-return trade-
off. So it may be prudent for investors to revisit the composition of a portfolio consisting
of index funds, particularly after major events. Policymakers may consider a temporary
restriction on short selling to reduce market over-reaction by providing a cooling off period.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Conclusions
Several topics in the field of bio-security are discussed in this dissertation.
In Chapter II, we used a Poisson regression model with adjustment dispersion associ-
ated with random simulation results from an AusSpead model to estimate the parameters
of the model given one location as the start point in the simulation, and we predicted the
probability/risk and expected cattle loss of FMD outbreak spreading to the premises, given
others as start points under different scenarios in the study area. Results show that cattle
numbers have a positive effect on probability of being infected, while distance between
start point and a given premises has a negative effect. Under different scenarios, the im-
pact of cattle number is slightly different, but distance has a similar negative impact on the
number of events under the four different scenarios. That is, when the distance between a
premises and an outbreak point is shorter than 20 miles, the ”marginal” impact of distance
will rise steeply when the distance decreases, while if the distance between a premises and
an outbreak point is longer than 20 miles, an increase or decrease in distance will not impact
the probability. Since distance plays an important role in predicting event probability, as
return, identifying high-risk areas depends on the spatial distributions of premises, and high
density of premises usually has high probability of transmission of the virus or becoming
infected. The total expected cattle loss plays an important role in decision making. When
FMD disease hits large premises-for example, large feedlots or large beef-a large cattle loss
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will occur. Based on the AusSpead simulation model, our estimation and prediction show
that large cattle loss was concentrated in three counties-Deaf Smith, Parmer, and Castro-
and those results were from approximately 70% feedlots with over 10,000 cattle located in
the counties. When an FMD virus is introduced into a backyard, the expected loss is about
88,000 head, while when an FMD virus is introduced into large or small feedlots or large
beef the loss is approximately double that number. Losses in the three counties are 141,
137, and 150 thousand head, respectively.
In Chapter III, we first tested the best mitigation strategies with average minimum
animal loss by the Tukey test, and the results showed that the best mitigation strategies for
all four scenarios are strategies 1, 5, 9, 10, and 15. Then we used one of the best strategies,
strategy 15, with the ”worst” or largest animal loss to estimate costs of disposing of animal
carcasses and transportation under four different scenarios and examined the effectiveness
of disposal strategies. The results show that the estimated average highest disposal cost
is under scenario 2, while the lowest is under scenario 4, because it had the largest-scale
carcass disposal when lower-cost disposal methods are exhausted, resulting in the need for
higher-cost disposal methods. Thus, the unit disposal cost will vary with carcass scale. The
unit transportation cost also varies by the distributions of the infected premises and disposal
locations. The estimated unit transportation cost is lower under scenarios 1 and 4 and
higher under scenarios 2 and 3 because under scenarios 2 and 3 the infected premises are
more highly concentrated, which causes less-optimal transportation options for the infected
premises.
In Chapter IV, we found that the mean of return over the FMD period is significantly
lower than that over the non-FMD period on the whole stock market, represented by the
FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250, but not significantly different for the food product and retail
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industry and food product companies. We also found that the conditional volatility over the
FMD period is much higher than that over the sample period for the large-capitalization
stock market (FTSE 100) and Devro, which is associated with meat products. For the
small-capitalization stock market (FTSE 250), the estimated conditional volatility over the
FMD period is slightly higher, while it is slightly lower for food products, the food and
drug retail industry, as well as Associated British Foods (non-meat products). The an-
nouncement of the confirmed cases had an impact on the large-capitalization market and
food-product firms, and it had the largest marginal impact on meat products. With an
estimated coefficient of .000036, it indicated when increase 1 confirmed case relatively
yesterday, the annual volatility will increase by 9.5%, while for non-meat products and
the large-capitalization market they are estimated as 4.1% and 3.3%, respectively, given
the original sample. Another finding is that the FMD does not have significant impact on
the whole food product and retail industry but does have an impact on the whole markets,
the reason being that on the one hand, although meat product companies are hit badly,
for non-meat-product firms-for example, Associated British Foods-the impact is small and
not significant, and even unconditional and conditional volatilities are lower over the FMD
period. On the other hand, the FMD hit badly not only the meat product companies but
also insurance and tourism companies, which are included in the whole market index. Our
results have important implications for index investing and option pricing. The index in-
vesting approach is generally considered a passive strategy. However, our results suggest
that major events may lead to volatility shifts and may alter the risk-return trade-off. So it
may be prudent for investors to revisit the composition of a portfolio consisting of index
funds, and policymakers may consider a temporary restriction on short selling to reduce
market overreaction, particularly after major events.
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5.2 Limitations and Future Research
In Chapter II there is a relatively large prediction error because some factors like animal
transportation, temperature, and wind cannot be included in the model. The estimated
probability is a conditional probability, and further research may focus on estimating the
probability to introduce a virus such that a complete decision can be made. The number of
research studies on individual firms is relatively small, so future research will undoubtedly
collect more food-product firm data and focus on policy discussion of short, temporary
restrictions to stabilize volatility after a major event such as an FMD outbreak.
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